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ABSTRACT
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TO THE 
CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTES IN THE MEDITRRANEAN SEA
Aysem Biiiz Tokat
M.A , Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Santiago Martinez Caro
October 1999
In this thesis, after explaining the historical evolution of the concept of the continental 
shelf, It is tried to show how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) solved two continental 
shelf disputes -  the Tunisia-Libya Case and the Aegean Sea Case - in the Mediten'anean Sea. 
Then, the other cases that deal with continental shelf delimitation and the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice are take into account. The Mediterranean Sea is characteresed 
by the diversity in ethnic, cultural and political perceptions all of which become a reason for 
potential instabilities and crises. Therefore, the solution of the continental shelf disputes 
contribute to peace and security in the Mediterranean Sea, playing a crucial role in eliminating 
increasing tensions. In the conclusion, it is argued that the solution of the legal aspect is not 
sufficient. Because of the changing nature of the law on the subject and the inconsistency in 
the decisions of the International Court of Justice, a system of projects for joint development 
are suggested as a means for peaceful final solutions of the disputes.
ÖZET
ULUSLARARASI ADALET DİVANE NIN AKDENİZ’DEKİ KITA SAHANLIĞI
ANALŞMAZLIKLARINA KATKISI
Aysem Biriz Tokat
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Santiago Martinez Caro
Ekim 1999
Bu tezde, kıta sahanlığı kavramının oluşumu anlattıktan sonra Uluslararası 
Adalet Divanı’m Akdeniz’de yer alan iki kıta sahanlığı anlaşmazlığının- Tunus-Libya 
Davası ve Ege Denizi Davası- nasıl çözümlediğini açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra, kıta 
sahanlığı ile ilgili diğer davaları ve Uluslararası Adalet Divam’mn kararlarını ele 
alındı. Akdeniz birbirinden farklı etnik, kültürel ve politik bir karaktere sahiptir ve bu 
yapı potansiyel dengesizlik ve krizler için bir neden oluşturmaktadır. Bu yüzden kıta 
sahanlığı anlaşmazlıklarının çözümü, Akdeniz’indeki barışa ve güvenliğe katkıda 
bulunur ve yükselen tansiyonun düşmesinde önemli bir rol alır. Bu konu ile ilgili 
hukukun değişen yapısı ve Uluslararası Adalet Divanı’nm kararlarındaki tutarsızlık 
yüzünden, ortak kalkınma projeleri sistemi bu anlaşmazlıkların barışçı çözümü için 
bir yol olarak önerilmiştir.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of the continental shelf is one of the subjects of international law about 
which a great deal of literature is written. The practice of states, the work of the International 
Law Commission in 1950’s, the records of the 1958 Geneva Conference and the Third United 
Nations Conference are matched by the writings of several scholars and the decisions of the 
International Court of Justice. This is not only because of the importance of the subject to the 
international community but also because of the fact that the law on the subject changed very 
rapidly.
Therefore, analysing this concept under the light of the judgements of the International 
Court of Justice will shed hght not only on the state practice about the continental shelf but 
also on the legal attitude of such an international body. In other words, the concept of the 
continental shelf will be assessed by the decisions of the International Court of Justice, in 
order to examine the contribution of this Court to the continental shelf disputes among the 
states.
Essentially, as a consequence of this, two main purposes are tried to be achieved in 
this study. As a first step, the continental shelf disputes in the Mediterranean will be described 
in order to clarify the substance of those problems. The second step, then, will be the analyses 
of the decisions given by the International Court of Justice under the light of the legal 
developments and state practice.
As a study field, the Mediterranean Sea is chosen because the problems that associated
with the continental shelf are particularly seen in enclosed and semi-closed seas. The physical 
disposition of coastal states and the geographical configuration of the enclosed and semi- 
enclosed seas make any change in the continental shelf especially difficult. The 
Mediterranean Sea has also the characteristics of the semi-enclosed seas.*
Comprising a long and a narrow corridor with a length of slightly over 2,000 nautical 
miles, this sea has a width under 600 n. m. at its widest point.^ Moreover, this limited area is 
divided between eighteen sovereign states as well as three dependent territories. The coasts of 
these littorals are very different from each other by length, configuration and direction.^
Table 1; Mediterranean coastlines and seabed allocation.
________________________ Coastal Length (n. m.~)_____ Seabed area Isq. n. m.)
Albania 153 6,114
Algeria 596 32,461
Cyprus 290 26,000
Egypt 537 51,387
France 491 25,787
Gaza Strip 21.6 -
Gibraltar (UK) 7 159
Greece 1,645 134,000
Israel 120 5,969
Italy 2,450 155,000
Lebanon 105 4,586
Libya 910 93,311
Malta 45 17,815
Monaco 3 82
Morocco 190 6,332
Sovereign Base Area (UK) 86 4,360
Spain 618 73,514
Syria 82 2,984
Tunisia 555 28,387
Turkey 973 17,323
Yugoslavia 426 20.453
* Source: “Sovereignty of the Sea” , Geographic Bulletin 3 
Map 1. The Mediterranean Sea.
* Source: http.www.expediamaps.com
‘ See Map Ion p.3
 ^The widest point in the Mediterranean Sea is between the Strait of Otranto and the Libyan coast as 600 n. m. 
 ^ See, Table Ion p.2.
Map 1. The Mediterranean Sea.
* Source; http.www.expediamaps.com
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Furthermore, the presence of many islands with different size and location give to this 
sea one of its most distinctive characteristic/ In addition to those characteristics, sensitive and 
complex issues regarding to the political status and economic significance lead to many legal 
and diplomatic problems.
To begin with a short historical outline about the continental shelf will be necessary in 
order to concentrate on the purpose of this study. Then, two chapters will deal with two 
disputes in the Mediterranean taking into consideration the judgements of the International 
Court of Justice. The disputes related to the continental shelf are considered as follows: the 
case between Tunisia and Libya and then the Aegean Sea dispute between Turkey and Greece. 
The next chapter is based on other cases about the continental shelf delimitation and the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to these cases. These cases-the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the Anglo-French Arbitration, Australia-New Guinea 
Negotiation, the Gulf of Main Case and the Libya-Malta Case- will provide sufficient clues 
and evidences in order to assess the contribution of the Court. The final chapter will focus on 
the assessment of the contribution of the International Court of Justice.
Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, Kerkennah Islands in the Central Mediterranean , Majorca in the Western 
Mediterranean are one of the examples.
CHAPTER 1
A HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
1.1. EARLY REFERENCES TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
The history of the continental shelf (CS) goes back to the 1910 decree of the 
Portuguese Government. That decree explained CS as a habitat of fisheries. It also stated that 
deep trawling by steam vessels beyond one hundred fathoms was extremely harmful to the 
fisheries. With this decree, fishing beyond one hundred fathoms was prohibited.^
Indeed, there was no clear definition of continental shelf in the 1910 decree of the 
Portuguese Government. This decree was a simple attempt in order to regulate the fisheries. 
The important point, however, is that the area over which the national jurisdiction was 
claimed, was beyond the territorial waters. In other words, this decree became the first 
intention to regulate the fisheries on the continental shelf.
In 1916, the second governmental attempt came from the Imperial Russian 
Government. The declaration of the Russian Government put forward that some of the islands 
were the integral part of the empire and formed the northern extension of the continental shelf 
of Siberia. However, this declaration did not deal with the submarine areas, whereas it was
 ^ The text of this decree is reprinted in “UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, 1951” , vol. 1 , p. 19.
stated that the northern extension of the continental shelf of Siberia, in which there were 
several islands was part of the Russian territory.^
The following years were shaped by the writers and jurists, who tried to form the basis 
of the continental shelf doctrine. One of the most leading figures was the writer Storni from 
Ai'gentma. In his paper written in 1916, he insisted on the importance of continental shelf for 
commercial fishing.^ In 1918, Odon de Buen, from Spain, claimed that the national
jurisdiction of the coastal state should extend to the continental shelf as a habitat of important
8edible specifies of fish.
An event developed in 1918 in the Gulf of Mexico provided a change in the course of 
continental shelf history. Discovering a huge oil pool in that gulf, a United States citizen 
asked the Government of the United States to grand him a property or a leasehold right to a 
tract of the ocean bottom that contained oil. He also demanded protection, for the artificial 
island that would be built for the use of the oil. In his application to the United States 
Government, he additionally, stated that if he had permission for his demands then he would 
grant the oil field to the government- but in the light of an agreed consideration.
The US response to this situation was the statement that the US had no jurisdiction 
over the ocean bottom of the Gulf of the Mexico beyond the outer limits of the territorial 
waters. Therefore, the US did not grant the requested rights to the US applicant. But, the only 
idea was that if the island was built and given to the United States control, then the
* A. Gündüz, “Tlie Concept Of tlie Continental Shelf In Its Hi.storical Evolution” , Istanbul: Maimara University, 
(1990), p. 17.
’ D. O’Connel, “ The Law of tbe Sea ”. Oxford:Clarendon Press, (1982), p.469.
* B. L. Austin, “The Continental Shelf. Tlie Practice and Policy of the Latin American States New 
YorkrOxford Press, (1961), p.42.
Department of State might provide protection. On the other hand, if the creation of the island 
did not lead to any attempts against the rights of the US citizens and no objection by a foreign 
government, then the Department of State would not oppose such an intention of creating an 
island.
Another event that shed light in continental shelf was the Ai'gentinean national 
Suarez’s attempt in 1925. Being a member of League of Nations’ Committee of Experts for 
the Progressive Codification of International Law, he suggested the extension of jurisdiction 
of the coastal state over the continental shelf with the aim of preserving and protecting the 
fisheries beyond the territorial water.'"’
Although Suarez’s proposal did not gain support, the idea he put forward remained as 
the constant policy among the Latin American States, until the acceptance of the exclusive 
economic zone. Again another Latin American writer Ruelas, for the first time in 1930 argued 
that the continental shelf had a natural prolongation of land territory and therefore belonged to 
the coastal state. In 1936, the theory founded by those Latin American writers gained a major 
support from the fishermen in the United States.
With the Japanese fishing fleets fishing salmon heavily in the Bristol Bay, Alaska, the 
US fishing industry reacted to those Japanese fisheries due to their overfishing. They saw 
these fishing fleets as a threat to their industry and therefore they protested against the Japan. 
As a result of these reactions, two bills were concluded.” The first one -the Diamond BiU- 
claimed that the sahnon in the rivers of the Alaska was the property of the United States.
 ^ See, “Reports of Exploitations of the Product of tlie Sea” in AJTL, Vol. 2, No.21, (1926), p.231.
D. O’Connel, “The International Law of tlie Sea” Oxford:Clarendon Press , (1982), p.469.
“ J. W. Bingham, “The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt” in AJIL, V o l.20 , No. 173, (1946), p.l79.
There would be a twelve-mile protection zone and an additional law enforcement area with a 
possible outer limit of 100-fathom line.'^
According to the other one, the Copeland Bill, the shallow depths of the Bering Sea 
must be regarded as a slightly submerged margin of the American Continent.’^  It aimed at the 
protection of the mineral deposits, fisheries, and animal life of the region. Additionally the 
extension of the Jurisdiction of the United States over the water and submerged land adjacent 
to the coast of Alaska was put on the table too. However, both of the bills were failed to pass
through the Congress. 14
J. W. Jessup, “The Pacific Fisheries” in AJIL Vol.33 , N o.l29, (1946). p.l81  
Ibid.
‘‘‘ Tlie legal basis on which tlie bills were based were criticized by Jessup in his article “The Pacific Fisheries” in 
p.135.
1.2 THE GULF OF PARIA TREATY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
1.2.1 GULF OF PARIA TREATY
The first treaty regulating the regime of the continental shelf was the Gulf of Paria 
Treaty. It was concluded between the United Kingdom and Venezuela in 1942. The Gulf of 
Paria Treaty is the first treaty that established and regulated the exclusive rights for the Parties 
in order to provide the possibility of exploration and exploitation of the submarine areas.
Defining the provisions and their respective interests in the submarine areas of the 
Gulf of Paria, both of the Parties had claims beyond the territorial waters. The Parties 
mutually recognised the high seas status of the overlying waters. It was decided that the 
navigation on the surface of the sea should not be changed due to any work or installation. 
Moreover, the Parties made further provisions for the protection of the environment against 
pollution, which might result from the explorations and exploitations.'^
Being a bilateral treaty, the Gulf of Paria Treaty was binding only the Parties 
concerned. Indeed, the area was not used for shipping purposes too much. Besides, the only 
coastal states were the parties themselves. On the other hand the treaty did not make any 
distinction between the seabed and the subsoil. It put them under the same regime. The treaty 
did not mention the term of “continental shelf’; they simply used the “submarine area of the 
Gulf of Paria”.
This Treaty was reproduced in “I UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, 44” , (1951)
For more details about the Treaty, see C. H. M. Waldock, “The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental 
S h elf’ in “The Grotious Society. Transactions for the Year 1948” Vol.36 ,N o .ll5 , (1950), pp.131-132.
But, interestingly, the United Kingdom formally annexed its submarine area to the 
Colony of Trinidad and Tobago, same as Venezuela that annexed its portion of the submarine 
area to its territory. On balance, the Gulf of Paria Treaty became important, because of the 
fact that it was the first treaty that obviously dealt with the continental shelf. On the other 
hand, with the annexations, it was also clear that the seabed and subsoil of the high sea could 
be taken over by occupation.
From 1910 to 1942, the continental shelf was either a habitat of the living resources 
where the coastal state(s) had rights or location of the minerals that could be exploited by the 
coastal state. Mainly, the continental shelf was seen as an area of physical nexus with the 
territory of the coastal state(s). But, the Gulf of Paria Treaty, although not being a declaration 
of the existing law, aimed at justifying their claims so that what they called the continental 
shelf would be recognised by themselves and by the other states.
1.2.2 PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION (TRUMAN PROCLAMATION)
The emergence of the continental shelf as a legal Institution was the result of the 
change in the ocean policy of the United States. In the 1930s, President Roosevelt dealt with 
the extension of the US jurisdiction with the aim of protecting the Alaskan Salmon against 
foreign states, especially, against the Japanese fishermen. The US Government also aimed at 
maintaining its interests in that region. As a result preparations were made in order to 
establish the basis of the new policy. Because President Roosevelt died shortly before the 
proclamations became ready for issuance, it fell to his successor Harry Truman to issue them, 
on September 28, 1945.*^
A. Gündüz, “The Concept of tlie Continental Shelf in its Historical Evolution’’. Istanbul; Marmara University, 
(1990), p.24.
The Presidential Proclamation (Truman Proclamation) concerning continental shelf 
contained two separate documents: one dealing with continental shelf, the other dealing with 
fisheries. On the document that focused on continental shelf, it was stated that there was a 
world-wide need for the resources of petroleum, gas and other minerals. According to the 
experts, on the other hand, these were available under many parts of the continental shelf off 
the coast of the United States.*** As a result, the proclamation argued that these oils and 
minerals could be used and therefore, over those regions, control and jurisdiction were 
needed. In the light of these facts, doubtless to say that the Truman Proclamation was built 
itself on a Just and reasonable ground.
According to that proclamation, close cooperation and protection from the coast 
should be obtained in order to provide the effective measures to utilize these resources. 
Moreover, the continental shelf might be considered as the extension of the landmass of the 
coastal state. Therefore, the resources in it -oil or other minerals- formed a seaward extension 
of the coastal state. As a result, the coastal state should not ignore self-protection and had to 
keep a close watch over activities on its coasts.
The United States, in this proclamation, put forward that the subsoil and the seabed of 
continental shelf belonged to the U.S. and were subject to its jurisdiction and control. The 
proclamation pointed out that where continental shelf bordered the coasts of other states(s), 
then the state(s) and the U.S. would determine the boundary according to the equitable 
principles. The proclamation itself did not define the outer limit of continental shelf. But, a 
press release issued simultaneously with the Proclamation defined the outer limit of
For further details about the Proclamation, see Presidential Proclamation, “No 2667 DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETTIN”, September 30 1945, pp.484-487.
continental shelf as no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet). 19
In the light of this statement, the area of continental shelf over which USA had 
jurisdiction became approximately 750.000 square miles. On balance, the United States 
acquired not sovereignty but Jurisdiction and control over that area. This proclamation, first of 
all, extended the jurisdiction of the coastal state over the resources of the continental shelf. 
Secondly, it introduced the ipso jure acquisition doctrine, which considered the continental 
shelf as natural prolongation of the land territory.
The Gulf of Paria Treaty opened the way for the positive law on continental shelf and 
was the first step; this Proclamation, finally, became the second step. After the Truman 
Declaration, many nations started to extend their jurisdiction to the seabed. Additionally, there 
were also cases of overlying waters beyond the territorial waters. The declarations that shaped 
the state practice, inter allia, took its essence from the Truman Proclamation."'’
Another conference was convoked with 19 states between 25-28 May 1956, in Ciudad 
Trujillo (Dominican Republic). The Ciudad Trujillo Conference led to the passage of a 
resolution on the legal status of submarine areas. As a consequence, continental shelf took the 
approval of most of the states. There was a general agreement on the extension of the national 
jurisdiction of the coastal state over the submarine areas beneath the high seas but contiguous 
to the coast, in other words over the continental shelf. However, the major problem came 
from the different definitions of continental shelf among the states.^’
See, “ UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, 39” , (1951).
Tlie practice of the Latin American .states like tlie Mexico Presidential Decree, tlie Pananumitm Regulations; 
tlie British practice like the Gulf of Parai Treaty; the practice of other states like tlie India prochunation.
The definition of die condnental sh elf: Scientifically, the term continental .shelf was understood to be diat 
portion of the continent or island which is covered by waters up to the point of declivity of tiie slope or die edge 
of the shelf.
In the view of some states, like USA, UK, Mexico, Brazil or Saudi Arabia, the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas of the high seas beyond the territorial waters, but 
contiguous to the coast constituted the continental shelf. Therefore, the legal status of the 
superjacent waters was not changed. According to other states like, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica or 
Panama, the continental shelf included the submarine areas and also the waters covering them 
(epicontinental sea). As a result of this definition, these states extended their national 
jurisdiction both to non-living and living resources of their continental shelf.
Apart from the definition of continental shelf, another disagreement among states 
came Ifom the seaward limits of their continental shelves. Because, for some states, the outer 
limit of continental shelf was set up at the 200 meter (100-fathom) depth line, while some of 
the other states preferred a 200-mile distance limit.
Moreover, the degree of power that would be used over those areas created another 
disagreement. The US, Saudi Arabia or Mexico claimed only control and jurisdiction whereas 
Chile or Peru insisted on sovereignty. On the other hand Australia and India preferred the 
term of “sovereign rights”. Although there were disagreements about some points, the basic 
agreement was that the coastal state had the continental shelf rights and therefore third parities 
cold not make any claims over it.
1.3 THE GENEVA CONVENTION (1958)
When the ILC began to deal with continental shelf and included it in its lists of subject 
for codification, the first step for the Geneva Convention was completed. Slowly but surely, 
the Commission tried to develop and codify the legal regime of the continental shelf between 
1950 and 1956. As a result, the International Law Commission proposed to the General 
Assembly to convoke a conference. The Conference was convened in Geneva, on February 
24, 1958. The objects were to analyse the results of the work of the ILC about the Law of the 
Sea and to draft international conventions. The Geneva Conference consisted of four 
committees and the Fourth Committee dealt with the subject of continental shelf·'.
The Geneva Convention was the first conventional regulation of the regime of 
continental shelf. It was signed on 29 April 1958 and came into force on 10 June 1964^ .^ 
Article 1 defined the continental shelf as:
a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast 
but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or 
beyond that limit, to where the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.
b) the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the 
coasts of the islands.
There was a clear distinction between the legal definition and the geological definition. 
First of all, according to the geological definition, the continental shelf extends from the 
coastUne, whereas the legal continental shelf extends from the outer limit of the territorial
Tlie other conventions concluded by tlie Conference are: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, in force 10 September 1964; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Sea, in force, 30 September1962.
The Convention is a relatively short document, consisting of 15 articles.
R. Platzoder, “The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea Basic Documents witli an Introduction”, 
Dorthrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, (995), p.32.
waters. Secondly, for the outer limit of the legal shelf, there were two possibilities. It can 
extend to depth of 200 meters which meets the outer limit of the geological shelf. The other 
possibility for the outer limit, regarding to the legal definition, is the line, which would be 
determined due to the technological capacity to exploit the natural resources of the submarine 
areas. But, this do not match with the geological definition.
On the other hand, the nature and the extend of the rights of the coastal state were 
indicated in the Article 2;
1. The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources.
2. The rights referred in paragraph 1 to this Article are exclusive in the 
sense that if the coastal state does not explore the continental shelf or 
exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or 
make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of 
the coastal state.
3. The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not 
depend on occupation, effective notional or on any express 
proclamation.^^
This Article, clearly, gives all rights to the coastal state(s) and excluded all potential 
claims of any third state. For the acquisition of the continental shelf rights occupation or any 
kind of proclamation were not necessary. They belonged ipso jure and ah initio to the coastal 
state. Article 4 paragraph 2 defined the natural resources that could be used by the coastal 
state:
4) The natural resources referred to in these Articles consist of the 
mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil 
together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is 
to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either immobile on 
or under the seabed or unable to move except in constant physical
25 Ibid.
contact with the seabed or subsoil.
Article 6 ot this Convention dealt with inter-state delimitation in situations, where the 
states involved are either opposite or adjacent to each other. The Fourth Committee focused 
on the '‘special circumstances” clause rather than on the “equidistant line” in their discussions 
to formulate a general application for this topic. Although three states, Greece, Portugal and 
Yugoslavia, opposed the inclusion of this element, most of the delegations defended the 
Commission’s d raft.T hey  supported the “special circumstances” as being necessary for the 
effective application of the whole delimitation provision. Tunisia and Indonesia were one of 
the supporters.
The delegate of Tunisia stated “delimitation ...should take account of the geographical 
configuration of the region, and that considerable flexibility would have to be used in 
applying that Article”."* The delegate of Indonesia argued the “International Law 
Commission’ s text is sufficiently flexible to provide all states whatever their geographical 
situation with the necessary safeguard.Statem ents of Iraq, UK, Italy, Sweden, USA and 
France were also in the same direction, that is to say, in agreement with the special
circumstances. 30
Article 6, as a result, was as follows:
26
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two 
or more states whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of 
the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be determined by 
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement and unless
Ibid., p.33.
F. Alinish, “The International Law of Maritime Boundarie.s and the Practice of States in the Mediterranean 
Sea”. Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1993), p.55.
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another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary line is the median line, every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest point of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each state is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two 
adjacent states, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be 
determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the 
nearest point of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea of each state is measured.^'
According to this Article, for two or more opposite or adjacent states sharing the same 
continuous continental shelf boundary, for the purpose of delimitation, agreement would be 
the first mean. If reaching an agreement is not possible or too difficult, then the second step 
would be shaped by the special circumstances -for instance, the presence of several islands- 
in the delimitation area in order to find out a negotiated line. However, if there is no special 
circumstances then the boundary line would be the median line in the case of opposite states 
and equidistant line in the case of adjacent states.
Although the Geneva Convention provided an important step for the legal definition of 
the continental shelf, some specific problems arising out of the interpretation of the 
Convention came also into the agenda. First of all, when the coastal state take measures for 
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf, then the traditional high seas freedom 
and the right of laying and maintaining submarine cable or pipelines on the seabed of the high 
seas could be influenced. For example, the exploration of the continental shelf or exploitation 
of its resources might lead to interference with the navigation or fishing. In addition to this, 
the exploitation criterion is not defined in the Geneva Convention and that uncertainty results 
also to a different problems.
Secondly, the coastal state is allowed to construct, maintain or operate on the 
continental shell installations and other devices necessary for the continental shelf exploration 
and exploitation. Establishing safety zones and exercising jurisdiction are other opportunities 
that could be used by the coastal state. Those installations do not have any territorial waters 
and also do not have the status of island all of which could create different problems.
Finally, it is no longer as free for the international community to do research 
concerning the continental shelf as it had been before the Convention was concluded. 
Because, the consent of the coastal state is needed. But, if this research is a purely scientific 
one and deals with the physical or the biological characteristics of the continental shelf and if 
the request comes from a qualified institution, then the state shall not withhold its consent. 
Moreover, the coastal state is entitled to participate or to be represented in the research. At the 
end of the research, the results of the research should be published.
R. Platzoder, “The 1994 UNCLOS Basic Documents with an Introduction”, Dotxecht; Martinus Nijhoff, 
(1995), p.35.
1.4. THE NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE
The first and the most unportant case in which the International Court of Justice gave 
its opinion is the ''NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE” of 1969. Generally speaking, 
this kind of cases have built on this case and on its interpretation. This case was based on the 
dispute about delimitation of the continental shelf concerning Federal Republic of Germany, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. With the request of the parties involved, the Court attempted to 
identify principles of general equity applicable to the delimitation of the area under 
consideration. No question was raised as to the seawards limits of the shelf in the North Sea 
and the Court, therefore, had to deal with the dehmitation of the continental shelf areas in the 
said sea.
Both, Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the dehmitation should be concluded 
according to Article 6 of the Convention.^^ In their view, there was no "special 
circumstances” in the North Sea and therefore, their boundaries with the Federal Repubhc of 
Germany should be determined by the application of the equidistance method.^^ However, 
from the perspective of Germany, first of ail, Article 6 was not applicable, because Germany 
had not ratified the Convention of 1958, while Denmark and the Netherlands did.^ '* Secondly, 
the rule of Article 6 did not become rule of customary international law.^  ^ Furthermore, 
Germany claimed that in any event, the rule could not be used, where it did not result in a just 
and equitable apportionment of the shelf. The Federal Republic, finally, emphasised the 
“special circumstances” existing in the North Sea. In other words, even if Article 6 became
See, North Sea Continental Shelf, (Federal Republic v. The Netherlands and Denmtirk), Judgement, ICJ., 
Reports, (1969), para.37
”  See, Submission No.3, Counter-Memorials of Denmark and The Netlierlands, in pleadings (1968), p. 221 
See, Submission No.3 in the Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, p.91
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customary law, then it again could not be applicable for this case, due to the special
circumstances. 37
Under this main framework, the Court decided on the basis of customary international 
law but dealt with some aspects of the Geneva Convention as well. From the perspective of 
the Court, the continental shelf was the land territory, which was a ''natural prolongation’’
under the sea.^ ® Neither the International Law Commission nor the Geneva Convention used 
the concept of “natural prolongation” in their context. The Court itself introduced it into the 
vocabulary of the international Law of the Sea.
According to the Court, the continental shelf of a state included “a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea” and the rights of the state “exists ipso 
facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land and as an extension of it”.^  ^As a 
result, the delunitation exercise of the Court would be shaped by the natural prolongation of 
each state under the sea. In other words, the determination of the extent of the underwater 
platform that belonged to the states would form the processes of delimitation. In the 
Judgement of North Sea Contiaental Shelf Case, the Court clearly stated the delimitation as 
follows:
“Delimitation is a process which involves estabhshing the boundaries 
of an area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State and 
not the determination de novo of such an area...The process of 
delimitation is essentially one of drawing a boundary line between 
areas which already appertain to one or other States effected.
”  Ib id ., p.422.
See, North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement, ICJ , Reports , (1969), para. 95. 
Ibid., para. 19.
Ib id ., paras. 18 and 20.
Indeed, this way of delimitation had only a declaratory character. It was not man-made 
or constitutive. As a result, the dehmitation became nothing more than noting the limits of the 
natural prolongation of each state. Moreover, this case showed that the analyses of the Court 
did not come from what should have been the interpretation of the whole rule of Article 6. 
Rather, the Court developed its view as part of the general principles of equity.
Moreover, Denmark and The Netherlands argued that the special circumstances could 
be taken into consideration only for cases, where a particular coastline, by reason of some 
exceptional feature, gave the state concerned an extend of continental shelf abnormally large 
in relation to the general configuration of its coasts.·*' Contrary to this argument, the Federal 
Repubhc claimed that the special circumstances clause did not constitute an exception to the 
rule of equidistance, but that these two elements were valid on an equal footing so that the 
equidistance element had no priority over the special circumstances element."*'
The Court, on the other hand, gave emphasis on the hierarchical order which was 
stated as follows:
Article 6 is so framed as to put second the obhgation to make use of 
the equidistance method, causing it to come after a primary obligation 
to effect delimitation by agreement. Such a primary obligation 
constitutes an unusual preface to what is claimed to be a potential 
general rule of law."*^
Although Article 6 could lead to different results due to the different geometrical 
construction of the varying cases, the strict version which provided a hierarchical order tried 
to be applied in the North Sea Continental Shelf dispute. Moreover, the Court overlooked the 
relationship between the equity and the special circumstances. In the Judgement, it was
See, the Danish and Netherlands Counter-Memorials, Pleadings, p.214-316 
‘‘ See, The Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, Pleadings, p.43
explained as follows:
Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with 
e q u ita b le  p r in c ip le s ,  and taking account of a ll  re le v a n t c irc u m sta n c e s , 
in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each party all those 
parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of 
its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the 
natural prolongation of the land territory.'*'*
The Court mixed what it cited as "all r e le v a n t c ir c u m s ta n c e s ’’ with the “special 
circumstances” under Article 6. It is true that the relationship between the equity and the 
special circumstances as coordinate principles may not be precise from the language of the 
Article 6. Therefore the Court denied the norm-creating character of this Article.'*^
On balance, after the conclusion of the Geneva Convention, it became clear that it did 
not meet the expectations of the international community Although there was a great support 
for the concept of continental shelf among the member states of the Geneva Convention, the 
precision of the concepts was not obtained. The lack of clearness or double-criterion about the 
concepts like the depth and distance criteria, the exploitation criterion or outer limit were 
other important challenging factors. Besides, the rapid development in the maritime 
technology created an additional reason for different disagreements among the nations. All of 
these elements opened the way for the new meetings and arrangements about the Law of the 
Sea and in particular about the continental shelf.
See, North Sea Continental Shelf Case, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, (1969) p. 72 
Ibid ., 93
45’ See Map 2 on p.23
Map 2. The agreed delimitation line in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case 
* Source: International Boundary Case, Cambridge: Grotius, p. 23
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1.5. THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS IH)
In 1967, Malta took the initiative and appealed to the General Assembly for revision 
or replacement of the Geneva Convention. The main purpose of that appeal was to clarify 
uncertainties about the limits of the national jurisdiction and the international regime. As a 
result of this attempt, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee in 1986. Then, 
it was replaced by the United Nations Seabed Committee aiming at preparing for the meeting 
of the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which would be 
convoked in 1974.
In Montego Bay, the results of these efforts came as “The United Nations Conference 
on Law of the Sea” in 1982. Having a chapter about the continental shelf, this convention 
introduced a new concept, “the exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) into the field of international 
law. These improvements- UNCLOS III and EEZ- led to a change in the concept of the 
continental shelf In the Geneva Convention. In Article 55, EEZ was defined as follows:
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this 
Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and 
the rights and the freedoms of other states are governed by the 
relevant provision of the Convention.'^^
For the breadth of the EEZ, the convention claimed that it should not go beyond 200 
nm from the baselines Ifom which the breadth of the territorial waters were measured (Article 
57). The continental shelf, on the other hand, was defined as follows:
The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and the
A. Gündüz, “The Concept of the Continental Shelf in its Historical Evolution”, Istanbul: Marmara University, 
(1990), p.205.
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance/^
During the drafting period, the final provisions for the delimitation of continental shelf 
and EEZ resulted in clash of the two ideas. The first one “median line or equidistance 
principle” was based on the proposal that the delimitation of both EEZ and continental shelf 
should be effected by agreement using as a general principle, the median line or equidistance 
line in consideration with the special circumstances where this is justified. The second one 
was “equitable principles”. According to that principles, the delimitation should be effected 
by agreement in accordance with equitable principles taking into account all relevant 
cii'cumstances. Session after session. Article 83 (1) and Article 74 (l)came on the final stage 
during the Tenth Session.
In Article 83 (1) and Article 74 (1), as a first step, it referred to agreements in order to 
achieve equitable solutions for all sides in conformity with international law as stated in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. But, if there was no agreement, 
the Part XV that including provisions for the settlement of the dispute, should be taken into 
account.
Both articles made agreement the primary mean for a solution. However, they were 
not able in clarifying the substance of the agreement and therefore the parties involved faced 
with difficulties. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the Court stated that “the 
delimitation must be subject of agreement between the states concerned.”'** According to this
Ib id ., p.206
See, North Sea Continental Shel f , Judgement, ICJ, (1969), p.85
statement, unilateral delimitation was rejected. Regarding this argument, the tribunal refused 
to “take into consideration a delimitation which did not result from negotiations or an 
equivalent act in accordance with international law”, in the Guinea- Guinea Bissau 
Arbitration. Within this context, the rules in Article 74 (1) and Article 83 (1) repeated the 
existing rules of conduct in all inter-state relations. Furthermore, these articles were based on 
the “good faith” and peaceful settlement of disputes”. However, these aspects too remained 
vague and open ended.
In the North Sea Case, the Court in defining “the obligation to negotiate meaningfully” 
referred to the cases of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex and Railway 
Traffic between Lithuania and Poland. And, it took as quotation that negotiation must be 
pursued “as fast as possible with a view to concluding agreements”'''·^  In the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case, the Court emphasised that the most relevant method for resolving the 
dispute would be negotiation and to open the ways for negotiation. Because, according to the 
Court, the negotiation was therefore a proper exercise of the judicial function of the Court.·’''
The cases related to the continental shelf disputes were also faced with the equitable 
principles, when agreement could not offer the proper solution for the cases. While these 
cases tried to be assessed by the notion of equitable principles, no attempt was made to 
identify the content of those principles for the continental shelf disputes. In the Judgement of 
the North Sea Case, the Court put emphasis on equity. However, the Court never maintained 
that in all circumstances, the application of the equitable principles should lead to an equitable 
solution.
Ibid., para. 87
See, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (UK v Iceland), Merits, ICJ, Reports, (1974), p.32
In the Anglo-French Arbitration of 1977, the Court argued that equity was achieved 
through a method which would pay attention to geography. Because it held that “the 
appropriateness of the equidistance method or any other method for the purpose of effecting 
an equitable delimitation is a function or reflection of the geographical and other relevant 
circumstances of each particular case.” *^ Unfortunately, the Tunisia-Libya Case went beyond 
the definitions of 1969 and 1977 cases. Because it said “the principles are subordinate to the 
goal. The equitableness of a principle must be assessed in the light of its usefulness for the 
purpose of arriving at an equitable result.”^^
Equity, as result of this statement , then became achieving a compromise between 
different claims. The Court, therefore, should select appropriate principles, that would lead to 
an equitable result. On the other hand, the Chamber in the Gulf of the Maine Judgement 
referred to equity as a fact-evaluation p ro cess .In  the Libya-Malta Case, the emphasis was 
put on the equitable solution.B ut the term of equitable principles were not clear enough. It 
referred to the results to be achieved as well as to the means to be applied to reach that result. 
The Court then tried to identify some of the principles in order to reach to a conclusion. 
Geography- the inequalities of the nature, nonencroachment by one party on the natural 
prolongation of the other were one of these stated principles.
As a result, under the main framework of the developments on the Law of the Sea, 
stated above, the concept of continental shelf has experienced an historical evolution. After 
the Truman Proclamation of 1945, a certain amount of high seas was put under the control 
and jurisdiction of the coastal state for the purpose of exploitation and exploration of its
See, The Anglo-French Arbitration, (UK v. France), Decision o f  18 Mar. 1978 , para. 97 
See, The Tunisia-Libya Case, Judgement, ICJ Reports, (1982) para. 70 
See, The Gulf of Maine Case, Judgement, ICJ Reports, (1984), para. 112 
See, The Libya-Malta Case, Judgement, ICJ Reports, (1985), para. 28
natural resources. The Geneva Convention of 1958, on the other hand, could not stay alive 
any longer against the technological developments and unclear definition in its articles that 
led to controversy among the states. In the Third United Nations Conferences on Law of the 
Sea, the natural prolongation, the principle of equidistance and Exclusive Economic Zone 
were added into the Convention of 1982 (UNCLOS III). Within these developments, the 
coastal states gained
• the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas,
• the fish swimming in it,
• the wind blowing over,
• the control and possession of the coastal state over the waters of the high seas 
within 200 miles of the coast.
Consequently, comparing the gain of the coastal state, it became clear that the loss of 
the international community that occurred so quietly made all of the developments a part of a 
peaceful revolution between the coastal states and the world oceans.
55 Ibid., para.45
CHAPTER 2
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE BETWEEN TUNISIA AND LIBYA
(FEBRUARY 1982)
2.1. BACKGROUND
The present situation of the land frontier between Libya and Tunisia dates from 1910. 
Both countries had been under Turkish suzerainty since the middle of the 16'*' century. 
Proclaiming a French protectorate in 1881, the Tunisia Regency had not experienced any 
dispute with the “vilayet” of Tripoli about the frontiers or boundaries. Because, both of them 
were under the internal border of the Ottoman Empire.
In 1886 and 1892, some suggestions were proposed between France and the Ottomans 
with a view to a delimitation. The boundary, in those years, located in the middle of AL- 
Biban lagoon, at the mouth of the Wad Fessi. Later on, it was moved eastwards in the 
direction of the Wad Moqta, and led to the de facto establishment of the present site of Ras 
Ajdir. The new direction of this boundary was stated in the "Convention relative a la frontière 
entre la régence de Tunis et le vilayet de Tripoli" which was concluded between the Bey of 
Tunis and the Emperor of the Ottomans on 19 Mayl910.
This frontier established in 19 May 1910 remained unchanged, between the Regency 
of Tunis under French protectorate and the Itahan colony of Tripolitania after Turkey had
ceded that region to Italy. The decolonisation efforts of those years also did not result in a 
new arrangement of suggestion for the 1910 frontier. In other words, after their independence 
too, Tunisia and Libya respected the same convention with the same frontier.
It had moreover been expressly confirmed by “the Treaty of Friendship and 
Neighbourly Relations” concluded on 10 August 1955 between France (on behalf of Tunisia) 
and Libya. On the other hand, Libya and Tunisia confirmed it implicitly by “the Treaty of 
Fraternity and Neighbourly Relations” on 7 January 1957. This treaty was amended and 
completed by “the Establishment Convention of 14 June 1961” and expressly confirmed by 
an exchange of letters at the time of signing of that Establishment Convention.
Throughout the two World Wars, the convention was accepted and no dispute was 
seen about the 1910 frontier. Then, two treaties strengthened the validity of this convention. 
The first one was “the Cairo Resolution of the Organisation of African Unity” in 1964. The 
important principle in this treaty was that, "all Member States pledge themselves to respect 
the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”. The second treaty was 
“the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States” which also accepted the same 
principle. Thus the permanence and stability of the land frontier is one of the points where the 
Parties are in full agreement. No issue was raised by the Parties concerning its validity.
An incident occurring in 1913, when an Italian torpedo boat arrested three Greek fishing 
vessels in an area claimed by Tunisia gave Italy a reason in order to propose a delimitation 
line. It would be drawn between Libyan and Tunisian sponge-banks, in the dhection of the 
coastline at Ras Ajdir. Italy developed this delimitation line and it became formal in 1919,
with the issuance of “Instructions for the Surveillance of Maritime Fishing in the waters of 
Tnipolitania and Cyrenalca”. It provided that ;
"As far as the sea border between TripoHtania and Tunisia is 
concerned, it was agreed to adopt as a line of delimitation the line 
perpendicular to the coast at the border point, which is, in this case, 
the approximate bearing north-north-east from Ras Ajdir."^^
In order to avoid the danger of friction that might arise from the position of a foreign 
vessel near the frontier, the Itahan authorities established two eight-mile buffer zones at the 
two ends of the Libyan coast. With this zone, vessels flying foreign flags and not holding a 
license from the Italian authorities would be liable to be ordered away but not seized. Both 
Parties recognised that an important solution had been achieved with this buffer zone, which 
operated for a long time without incident and without protest from any side. The line was 
reaffirmed by the Italian authorities in Libya in 1931. After the independence of both 
countries, the situation existed in this respect.
On the other hand, Tunisia has concluded an agreement, dated 20 August 1971, with 
Italy. This agreement shaped the delimitation of the contmental shelf between the two country 
on a median-line basis. But special arrangements were put into effect for the Itahan islands of 
Lamplone, Lampedusa, Linosa and PanteUeria. So far as seawards limits are concerned, no 
delimitation agreement has been concluded by either Party with Malta.
See, Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, (1982), p.58. 
See Map 3 on p.32.
M ap 3. T he  d e lim ita t io n  lin e  betw een Ita ly  and T u n is ia .
* Source: The  T u n is ia -L ib y a  Case, Judgem ent, ICJ, R eports , (1 9 8 2 ), p.36.
Neither Tunisia nor Libya had concluded any agreement delimiting any part of the 
continental shelf, or a certain area of their territorial sea. However, this did not prevent the 
activities of exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf. Each Party granted licenses 
or concessions in the continental shelf areas regarded by each Party as necessarily 
appertaining to itself. As a result of this, a considerable amount of drilling had taken place.
On the Libyan side, the legislative authorisation for this process was completed.^® It was 
only in 1968 that the first offshore concession was granted by Libya. Between 1968 and 1976, 
fifteen wells were drilled in an offshore concession area, several of which proved productive. 
In the meantime, Tunisia had granted its first offshore concession in 1964. In the concession 
granted in 1972, it was expressed that the concession boundary between Tunisia and Libya 
had to be bounded on the south-east direction. However, the position of this statement was not 
clear. In 1974, this boundary was specified as being a part of “the equidistance line ... 
determined in conformity with the principles of international law pending an agreement 
between Tunisia and Libya defining the limit of their respective jurisdictions over the 
continental shelf'.^®
In the same year Libya granted another concession. According to this, the western 
boundary was a line drawn from Ras Ajdir at some 26° to the meridian, that is to say, further 
west than the equidistance line. Consequently, the result was an overlapping of claims of each 
Party in an area some 50 miles from the coasts. Following protests in 1976 by each
Petroleum Law No. 25”, and “Petroleum Regulation N o .l” came into effect on 19 July 
1955 and both of them were the legal essence of the arguments of Libya.
See, Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, ICJ, Judgement, Reports, (1982), p.60.
Government, diplomatie discussions led to the signing of the “Special Agreement” on 10 June 
1977. With this Special Agreement, it was decided to bring the matter before the Court. Even 
after the proceedings before the Court had begun, further activities by each Party led to 
protests by the other. The Court was requested to declare general principles and rules of 
international law which were applicable to the delimitation of the areas of continental shelf 
appertaining to Tunisia and Libya in the region concerned.^”
Flowever, apart from the licenses given for the purpose of exploitation and exploration, 
there has never been any agreement between Tunisia and Libya on the delimitation of the 
territorial sea, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, or the continental shelf, upon 
which the Parties formally agreed yet. This situation constituted one of the difficulties of the 
dispute between Tunisia and Libya, because the delimitation of the continental shelf should 
start from the outer limit of the territorial sea, in accordance with Article 1 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.^^
Because of the absence of agreement signed about the continental shelf areas appertaining 
to the Parties, the 1910 Convention became an important feature for the consideration of the 
present case. Because it definitely established the land frontier between the two countries. 
Moreover, both Parties had the same view about the starting point which reinforced the 
significance of the place “Ras Ajdir”. As the starting point, Ras Ad jir had a crucial role in the 
present case. In addition to this factor, this area became important because, it was the point 
where the unilateral claims and certain partial maritime delimitation tried to be realised by the
All of tlie requests tliat were stated by tlie Parties will be described in a more detailed way in tlie following 
parts.
‘^Article 1; the continental shelf is referring a)to the seabed and subsoil of die submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside die area of the territorial sea, to a depdi of 200metres, or beyond diat limit, to where die depdi 
of die superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of die natural resources of the said areas; b) to die seabed and 
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to die coasts of islands.
Parties. Apart from the concessions given by each Party for the purpose of exploitation and 
exploration, those claims too played a crucial role in the Tunisia-Libya Case concerning the 
continental shelf.
First of all, Tunisia claimed that the ZV (Zénith vertical) 45° line was drawn from the 
land frontier at Ras Ajdir, at an angle of 45° in a north-easterly direction. According to 
Tunisia, Article 62 of the “Instruction of the Director o f Public Works on the Navigation and 
Sea Fisheries Department” (31 December 1904) did in fact define the areas of surveillance 
for the llshing of sponges and octopuses, where the administrative authorities exercised 
exclusive power like control and regulations. At the first time, the ZV 45° was mentioned in 
“the Decree of 26 July 1951”, reorganising the “Legislation on Fishery Control” Article 3 
(b) of which contained a spécifie reference to the line in the following terms:
"(b) From Ras Kaboudia to the Tripolitanian frontier, the sea area 
bounded by a line which, starting from the end of the 3-mile line 
described above, meets the 50-metre isobath on the parallel of Ras 
Kaboudia and follows that isobath as far as its intersection with a line 
drawn north-east from Ras Ajdir, ZV 45°."^^
However, the Tunisian ZV 45° north-eastern Rne could include a limited area for the 
specific fishery regulations and therefore had the nature of an unilateral claim. Besides, it was 
not a line plotted for the purpose of maritime delimitation.
Secondly, on the side of the Libyan claims, it was seen a northerly direction in 
conformity with the land boundary established by the 1910 Convention. This line was issued 
in the “Petroleum Law” (Law No.25 of 1955) on 21 April 1955. This was followed by
See, Tunisia-Libya Case, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, (1982), p. 64
“Petroleum Regulation N o.l” of 15 June 1955.^  ^ Article 3 of the 1955 Law established a 
division of the territory of Libya into four petroleum zones and Article 4, paragraph 1, 
included the following provision :
"This Law shall extend to the seabed and subsoil which lie beneath the 
tenitorial waters and the high seas contiguous thereto under the 
control and Jurisdiction of the United Kingdom of Libya. Any such 
seabed and subsoil adjacent to any Zone shall for the purpose of this 
Law be deemed to be part of that Zone."^ "*
This Article referred to the "seabed and subsoil which lie beneath the territorial waters 
and the high seas contiguous thereto under the control and Jurisdiction" of Libya. However, 
there is no evidence that Libya had claimed control and Jurisdiction over a continuous zone, 
before the enactment of this Law. Both the Law and the Regulation are purely mternal 
legislative acts, intended to identify domestic zones for the petroleum exploration and 
exploitation activities of Libya.
The claims of the Parties -the ZV 45° line of Tunisia and the northward line under the 
Petroleum Law No.25 of 1955 and Regulation No.l of Libya- were based on the unilateral 
actions. However, the maritime boundaries should be determined by agreement between the 
Parties. This principle was stated in the Fisheries Case o f 1951 as follows;
‘The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect it 
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as 
expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of 
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal 
State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with 
regard to other States depends upon international law."*^ °
Botli of them were published in the Official Gazette of Libya.
See, ICJ, Reports (1982), p.84.
See, The Fisheries Case, Judgement, ICJ, Reports 1951, p. 132.
Each party soughed to claim particular areas of the sea-bed as their natural prolongation 
of their land territory so that they could prove the essence of their concessions and lines. The 
Court was asked to determine what principles and rules of international law were applicable 
to the continental shelf delimitation between Tunisia and Libya of the respective areas 
appertaining to each. All of these facts shed light on the truth that the Court should examine 
very carefully all factors and arguments of the Parties relating to this case.
2.2. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The Registry of the Court received a letter of 25 November 1978 on 1 December1978. 
Tunisia, in this letter, notified the Court of a “Special Agreement” signed between Tunisia 
and Libya on 10 June 1911.^^ On the other hand, Libya send a letter of 14 Februaryl979 
received in the Registry of the Court on 19 February 1979. Libya too, made a like notification 
by enclosing the Special Agreement concluded between Tunisia and Libya. In both of the 
letters, the first five articles explained the aim of their requests and also the procedures after
the decisions of the Court were completed 67
In Article 1, the Court was requested to adjust and declare what were the principles 
and rules of international law which might be applied for the delimitation of the area of the 
continental shelf appertaining to Tunisia and the area of the continental shelf appertaining to 
Libya, by taking into account the equitable principles and the relevant circumstances which 
characterised the area, as well as the recent trends admitted at the Third Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. In the second part of Article 1, the Court was further asked to specify 
precisely the practical way in which these principles and rules apply in this particular situation 
so that the experts of the two countries did not face with any difficulties in the delimitation of 
the ai'ea.
Article 2, on the other hand, stated that after the delivery of the Judgement by the 
Court, two Parties should meet to put into effect these principles and rules in order to 
determine the line of the continental shelf delimitation appertaining to each of the two 
countries, with a conclusion of a treaty in this matter.
“  “International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf’. Cambridge:Grotius Publications, p.927 
The five Article of the Special Agreement are stated in Appendix C.
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According to Article 3 if the agreement mentioned in Article 2 was not reached within 
a period of three months, the two Parties should together go back to the Court and request 
such explanations or clarifications that might facilitate the task of the two delegations. The 
two Parties should comply with the Judgement of the Court and with its explanations and 
clarifications. Article 4 described the proceedings which as based on the submission of the
Memorials, Counter-Memorial and presentation of the Oral Arguments. 68
On 30 January 1981, Malta filed an Application requesting permission to intervene in 
the case under Article 62 of the Statute. The Article of the Statute invoked by Malta was as 
follows:
1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature 
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a 
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request.
Under Article 81, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, an apphcation for permission to 
intervene under Article 62 of the Statute shall specify the case to which it relates, and shah set
out:
(a) the interest of a legal nature which the State applying to intervene 
considers may be affected by the decision in that case;
(b) the precise object of the intervention;
(c) any basis of jurisdiction which is claimed to exist as between the 
State applying to intervene and the parties to the case.^°
The Court noted that Malta was not successful in showing possession of an interest of 
a legal nature in relation with the three matters specified in Article 81, paragraph 2, of the
The special Agreement was stated in “the Tunisia-Libya Case”, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, 1982, p.3.
“Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice”, New York: United Nations, 
pp.94.
™ See, “The Tunisia-Libya Case”, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, 1982, p.8.
Rules7* As a result, the object of its request fell altogether outside the scope of the form of 
intervention which was provided in Article 62. By a Judgement dated 14 April 1981, the
Court found that request of Malta could not be granted.72
2.2.1. TUNISIA
In the course of the written proceedings, both Parties presented their submissions. First 
of all, Tunisia, in its Memorial, made its statements due to the first part of the Article 1 of the 
Special Agreement of 10 June 1977 which requested the Court to define the general principles 
and rules of international law for the delimitation of the continental shelf areas. In the view of 
Tunisia, the dehmitation should take into account the physical and natural characteristics of 
the area, as to leave all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural 
prolongation of their land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the 
natural prolongation of the land territory of the other.
Secondly, the delimitation must not encroach upon the area where Tunisia possessed 
“well-established historic rights”. This area was defined on the side towards Libya by Line 
ZV 45° and in the direction of the 50-metre isobath. Moreover, taking into account the 
“géomorphologie peculiarities" of the region, it was possible to establish a natural 
prolongation of Tunisia that extended eastwards towards the areas between the 250-metre and 
300-metre isobath, and south-eastwards as far as the zone constituted by the Zira and Zuwarah 
Ridges.
’ ’ Ibid.
72Mbid. , p . l l .
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Furthermore, in the east and southeast of this region, the relevant circumstances which
characterised the area should be carefully examined. “The relevant circumstances” which
shaped the area were as follows:
• the fact that the eastern coastal front of Tunisia is marked by the presence of a body of 
islands, islets and low-tide elevations which form a constituent part of the Tunisian httoral
• the fact that the general configuration of the coasts of the two States is reproduced with 
remarkable fidelity by the bathymetric curves in the delimitation area and that this fact is 
simply a manifestation of the physical and geological structure of the re-Ion ; that in 
consequence the natural prolongation of Tunisia is oriented west-cast, and that of Libya 
southwest - northeast;
• the potential cut-off effect for Tunisia which could result from the particular angulation of 
the Tunisia-Libyan Uttoral in combination with the position on the coast of the frontier 
point between the two States;
• the irregularities characterising the Tunisian coasts, resulting from a succession of 
concavities and convexities, as compared with the general regularity of the Libyan coasts 
in the delimitation area ;
• the situation of Tunisia opposite,. States whose coasts are relatively close to its own, and 
the effects of any actual or prospective delimitation carried out with those States.’^
All of these considerations argued by Tunisia were related to the first part of the Article 1 
of the Special Agreement. For the second part of Article 1 of the Special Agreement which 
looked for a specified practical method to be used for the delimitation, Tunisia clarified its 
arguments in its Memorial. From the perspective of Tunisia, the delimitation should lead to
73 See, ‘Tunisia- Libya Case”, Judgement, ICJ, 1982, p.22
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the drawing of a line, but, the géomorphologie factors -like the existence of a Crestline 
constituted by the Zira and Zuwarah Ridges- and the general orientation of the natural 
prolongation of the territories of the two countries toward the abyssal plain of the Ionian Sea 
should not be ignored. The delimitation line could either :
(a) be constituted by a line drawn at the Tunisia-Libyan frontier parallel 
to the bisector of the angle formed by the Tunisia-Lib yan littoral in the 
Gulf of Gabes; or
(b) be determined according to the angle of aperture of the coastline at the 
Tunisia-Libya frontier, in proportion to the length of the relevant 
coasts of the two States.’"'
In the Counter-Memorial, Tunisia repeated its arguments but referring to the first part of 
the Article 1 of 10 June 1977, put forward that the delimitation must be in conformity with 
'"the equitable principles" and should take into account “the relevant circumstances" in order 
to arrive an equitable solution.
2.2.2. LIBYA
Libya, too, submitted its Memorial and Counter-Memorial to the Court. Libya stressed 
the importance of the juridical link between the continental shelf and the state practice.’  ^
Because a state was entitled ipso facto and ab initio to the continental shelf which, was the 
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea. Moreover, any delimitation 
should leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that had 
such a natural prolongation. Respecting the principle of the natural prolongation and the ipso
Ibid ., p. 42
See, F. Ahnish, “The International Law of Maritime boundaries and the Practice of the States in the 
Mediterranean”. Oxford: Clarendon , p 317
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jure rights of a coastal State, a delimitation, for Libya, should be in accordance with the
equitable principles.76
Libya stated that the direction of the natural prolongation was determined due to the 
geological and geographical relationship of the continental shelf to the continental landmass. 
Because in the present case, the continental shelf off the North Africa was a prolongation to 
the north of the continental landmass, an appropriate method should reflect this direction.^^
On the side of the appropriate method, Libya argued that application of the 
equidistance method was not obligatory and any method of the delimitation in accordance 
with equitable principles would be tested by its results. The equidistance method, for Libya, 
was neither a rule nor a principle and therefore was not obligatory on the parties either treaty 
or as a rule of customary international law. Besides, it also led to inequitable results under 
particular circumstances.
In its Counter-Memorial, Libya made additional proposals. It was stated that the natural 
prolongation of the land territory of a state was determined by the whole physical structure of 
the landmass as indicated by geology. Submarine ridges of the sea-bed did not disrupt the 
essential unity of the continental shelf and did not provide a scientific basis for a legal 
principle of delimitation.
On the other hand, according to Libya, the “fishing rights” claimed by Tunisia as 
“historic rights” were in any event irrelevant to shelf delimitation in the present case. The 
practical method for the application of the principles and rules of international law in this
Ibid.
’’ See, ICJ Reports (1982), p.51
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specific situation is to continue the reflection of the direction of the natural northward 
prolongation from the outer Limit of the territorial sea, without effecting the rights of States 
not parties to these proceedings.
After the written proceedings, the oral proceedings were completed and none of the 
Parties presented a different statement from what put forward in their written proceedings.
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During the proceedings, all of these documents put forward by the Parties concerned led 
to the analyses and assessments of the Court in order to reach a solution that could be 
necessary for both sides. Therefore, the Court examined the Special Agreement and also the 
arguments stated in the Memorial and Counter-Memorial of Tunisia and Libya.
Under Article 1 of the Special Agreement, the Court was required first to state "the 
principles and rules of international law which may be applied for the delimitation of the area 
of the continental shelf" appertaining to each of the two countries respectively.^* The Court 
had to take account the three factors mentioned in the Special Agreement:
• equitable principles;
• the relevant circumstances which characterised the area and
• the new accepted trends in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
While the Court had to regard to all legal sources specified in Article 38, paragraph 1, 
of the Statute of the Court in determining the relevant principles and rules applicable to the 
delimitation, it is also bound, in accordance with paragraph 1 (a), of that Article, to apply the 
provisions of the Special Agreement. '^·  ^Two of the three factors -the equitable principles and 
the relevant circumstances- referred in harmony with the jurisprudence of the Court, as it was 
stated in the Judgement of the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. Because, in that Judgement
2.3. THE COURT
See, Attard, “The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law”, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1989), p.l27. 
Article 38 / 1 ;  The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance witli international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states.
it was hold that international law required delimitation to be effected "in accordance with 
equitable principles, and taking account of all relevant circumstances"**“
The Court was authorised by the Special Agreement to take into account "new 
accepted trends" which could be considered, as the term "trends" as having reached an 
advanced stage of the process of elaboration. The Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea had however not yet come to an end. According to Tunisia, the "trends", so far 
as they did not constitute general international law, were to be taken into account as "factors 
in the interpretation of the existing rules''.^* In any event, however, any consideration and 
conclusion of the Court in connection with the application of the "trends" was confined 
exclusively to the legal relations of the Parties in the present case.
However, the Court had to take account of the progress made by the Conference even 
if the Parties had not mentioned it in their Special Agreement. It could not ignore any 
provision of the draft convention. Because if it came to the conclusion that the provision was 
binding upon all members of the international community, it then would embody or 
crystallise a pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law.
In the second part of Article 1, the Special Agreement, required the Court to "clarify 
the practical method for the application of these principles and rules’’.**^ In other words, 
those it finds applicable to the delimitation, would result, in the delimitation of these areas 
without difficulties" for this specific situation. On the other hand, the Parties did not use the
See, “The North Sea Continental Shelf Case”, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, (1969), p.53. 
See, Weil, “The Law of Maritime Delimitation”, Cambridge; Oxford, (1987), p.249.
82 See, ICJ Reports (1982), p62.
right to choose the method to be adopted; instead, they have asked the Court to determine 
the method for them.
This case, according to the Court, would seem to lie between the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases of 1969, in which the Court was asked only to indicate what 
principles and rules of international law were applicable to the delimitation, and the Franco- 
British Arbitration on the Dehmitation of the Continental Shelf of 1977, in which the Court 
of Arbitration was requested to decide what was the course of the boundary between the 
portions of the continental shelf appertaining to each of the Parties in the relevant area.
According to Tunisia, the Court is required to specify precisely the practical way in 
which the principles and rules should be applied.*  ^ If a choice of method would give occasion 
for disagreement, the Court itself had to decide the option from both the legal and practical 
points of view in order to avoid any problem due to any differences of opinion which might 
arise between the experts of the Parties
The Libyan view, however, was that the Court was not authorised to carry the matter "right up 
to the ultimate point before the purely technical work".*'  ^ In general, Libya clearly argued in 
favour of a more restrictive interpretation of the Special Agreement. Its contention was that 
in clarifying the "practical method" for the apphcation of the principles and rules of 
international law, the Court is to indicate the additional considerations and factors which have 
to be taken into account and balanced. But it had not been invited to set out the specific 
method of delimitation itself.
Pazarcı, “Uluslararası Hukuk”, AnkaraTurhan, (1998), p.397. 
Ibid ., p.381.
The Court also analysed Articles 2 and 3 of the Special Agreement which made it 
clear that the Parties recognised the obhgation to comply with the Judgement of the Court.^  ^
On balance, the Court saw that there was not any substantial distinction between a "method 
of delimitation" and a "practical method for the application o f ... principles and rules in this 
specific situation, that would enable the experts of the two countries to delimit the area".^  ^
The careful examinations of the pleadings and arguments of both Parties led the Court to 
conclude that there was here no fundamental difference of opinion between them. In the 
final analysis, a difference of emphasis as to the respective roles of the Court and of the 
experts of the two countries were put on the table. The Court, therefore, considered the 
whole controversy as of minor importance.
See, ICJ Reports, (1982), paras. 22-31. 
Ib id ., p.32.
The Court in its decision, iirst of all shed light on the general principles and rules of 
international law applicable for the delimitation, that would enter into force by agreement 
after the implementation of the present Judgement. First of all, the delimitation had to be 
effected in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of ail relevant 
circumstances. The relevant circumstances that would be taken into account in achieving an 
equitable delimitation include the following:
2.4. DECISION OF THE COURT
(1) the fact that the area relevant to the delimitation in the present case is bounded by the 
Tunisian coast from Ras Ajdir to Ras Kaboudia and the Libyan coast from Ras AJdir to Ras 
Tajoura and by the parallel of latitude passing through Ras Kaboudia and the meridian 
passing through Ras Tajoura, the rights of third States being reserved;
(2) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, and in particular the marked change 
in direction of the Tunisian coastline between Ras Ajdir and Ras Kaboudia;
(3) the existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands;
(4) the land frontier between the Parties, and their conduct prior to 1974 in the grant of 
petroleum concessions, resulting in the employment of a hne seawards from Ras Ajdir at an 
angle of approximately 26° east of the meridian, which line corresponds to the line 
perpendicular to the coast at the frontier point which had in the past been observed as a de 
facto maritime limit;
(.5) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in 
accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the 
continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length of the relevant part of 
its coast, measured in the general direction of the coastlines, account being taken for this
purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitation 
between States in the same region.*^
Secondly, the area relevant for the delimitation had a single continental shelf as the 
natural prolongation of the land territory of both Parties, so that in the present case, no 
criterion for delimitation of shelf areas could be derived from the principle of natural 
prolongation.^^ Finally, in the particular geographical circumstances of this case, the physical 
structure of the continental shelf areas could not offer a determination of an. equitable line of
delimitation. 89
After assessing the general principles and rules of international law, the Court referred 
to the practical method for the application of the stated principles and rules of international 
law in the particular situation of the present case. The delimitation made up two sectors each 
requiring the application of a specific method of delimitation in order to achieve an equitable
solution 90
In the first sector, the sector closer to the coast of the Parties, the starting point for the 
line of delimitation was the point where the outer Hmit of the territorial sea of the Parties was 
intersected by a straight line drawn from the land frontier point of Ras Ajdir through the point 
33°55'N, 12'’E, which line runs at a bearing of approximately 26" east of north, corresponding 
to the angle followed by the northwestern boundary of Libyan petroleum concessions 
numbers NC 76, 137, NC 41 and NC 53, which was aligned on the south-eastern boundary of
” For further informatioii about the relevant circumstances , ICJ, Reports (1982) and Weil, “The Law ot 
Maritime Delimitation” Cambridge: Grotius , (1989), p. 266.
See, The Tunisia-Libya Case, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, (1982), para.77.
Ibid. ,para.78.
Ibid., para.82
Tunisian petroleum concession "Permis complémentaire ojfshore du Golfe de Gabès" (21 
October 1966); from the intersection point so determined the üne of delimitation between the 
two continental shelves is to run north-east through the point 33”55'N, 12“E, thus on chat 
same bearing, to the point of intersection with the paraUel passing through the most westerly 
point of the Tunisian coastline between Ras Kaboudia and Ras Ajdir, that is to say, the most 
westerly point on the shoreline (low-water mark) of the Gulf of Gabès.
In the second sector, namely -the area which extends seawards beyond the paraUel of 
the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabs- the line of delimitation of the two continental 
shelves is to the east in such a way as to take account of the Kerkennah Islands; that is to say, 
the delimitation line is to run parallel to a line drawn from the most westerly point of the Gulf 
of Gabès bisecting the angle formed by a line from that point to Ras Kaboudia and a line 
drawn from that same point along the seaward coast of the Kerkennah Islands, the bearing of 
the deümitation line parallel to such bisector being 52" to the meridian; the extension of this 
line northeastwards is a matter falling outside the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, 
as it will depend on the deümitation to be agreed with third States.^^
Ibid., para.88
Ibid., paras. 108-112. Map 4 illustrates die alternative lines proposed by die parties on p.52 and Map 5 shows
die decision of the Court.
Map 4. Alternative lines proposed by the parties
Source: Tunisia-Libya Case. Judgement. ICJ. Reports. (1982) p.81
Map 5. The decision of the Court
* Source: Tunisia-Libya Case, Judgement. ICJ, Reports, (1982) p.90
CHAPTER 3
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE
(19 December 1978)
3.1. BACKGROUND
The Aegean is a semi-closed sea between Turkish and Greek mainland. There are 
numerous Greek islands in the Aegean which are anywhere from less than one mile to a few 
miles off mainland Turkey. But these islands are at a considerable distance from mainland 
Greece -  approximately 150 miles. These islands were under Ottoman sovereignty for about 
400 years and were given to Greece by the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 and Peace Treaty 
of 1947.^^
Table 2. Area of the Greek Islands 
^Source: statistical Yearbook of Greece (1995)
Islands Area (sq.km) Islands Area (sq.km)
Aghios Eustratios 43 Lesvos 1,630
Antispara 4 Limnos 476
Astypalca 97 Lipsi 16
Chios 842 Nisyros 41
Ikaria 255 Patmos 34
Kalymnos 111 Psara 40
Karpathos 301 Rhodes 1,398
Kasos 66 Samos 476
Klalki 28 Samothrace 178
Kos 290 Symni 58
Leros 53 Tilos 63
Within this treaty, the Straits were internationalized ,, the lands of both sides were demilitarized. But Turkey
was allowed to send its troops through the neutral zones as needed as well as to station maximum 
Turkey gained final control of the Straits with the Montreux Agreement in 1936
12,000 men.
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Map 6. The Aegean Sea 
* Source: http.www.expediamaps.com
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From 1960 onwards, Greece had granted licenses and conducted extensive exploration 
activities on the Aegean Continental Shelf. In 1972, Greece granted new oil exploration 
concessions in the high seas areas of the Aegean on the basis of a unilateral claim that these areas 
were part of its continental shelf.
This dispute came to the forefront for the fist time in November 1, 1973. On that date, the 
Turkish Government gave mineral exploration licenses in the eastern Aegean to the Turkish 
Petroleum Com pany.Turkey made public a map that showed the delimitation of respective 
continental shelves in the Aegean Sea. According to the Greek Government, this map did not take 
into account the presence of the Greek Is lands . In  1973, Turkey granted 27 permits to the 
Turkish Petroleum Company to explore for petroleum on the high sea areas westward of the 
Greek islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Aghios, Eustratios, Lesbos, Chios, Psara, and Antispara.
The Greek Government questioned the validity of these licenses by a Note Verbale of 7 
February 1974. In that Note Verbale, Greece based itself on international law as codified by 
Articles 1 (b) and 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf It was also 
argued that the continental shelf between two States required to be delimited on the basis of 
equidistance by means of a median line.^  ^The answer of the Turkish Government came on 27
See, N. Deloukas. “The Controversy between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea” in “Issues and Studies”, 
No.70, (1980), p.70.
”  Resmi Gazete, (The Official Gazette of Turkey), (1.November. 1973)
See, “The Aegean Sea Case”, Judgement, ICJ, Reports, (1976), para. 16 
’’ A. Wilson, “The Aegean Sea Dispute” in “Institute for Strategic Studies”, No. 155, (1980)
In Article 1 (a) the continental shelf was referred as to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 m., or beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.
’’ See, ICi Reports , {1916) para.22
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February 1974. By that Note Verbale, it was stated that “the Greek Islands were situated very 
close to the Turkish Coast and did not possess a continental shelf of their own.” '°° In addition to 
this, Turkey opened a discussion about the apphcability of the equidistance principle and 
suggested a solution in conformity with international law by means of agreement.
Greece, on the other hand, indicated that it was not opposed to a delimitation based on the 
provision of international law as codified by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. According to the Turkish Government, two Governments had to use all possibilities to 
reach to an agreed solutions of various problems that based on their neighbourly relations in the 
Aegean Sea. With this statement, Turkey expressed their readiness to enter into negotiations for 
the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries.
On 29 May 1974 the Turkish oceanographic research vessels “^andarli” and “Hora” 
sailed into the Aegean Sea for the purpose of carrying out research activities. The Greek 
Government interpreted this exploration as a breach of exclusive sovereign rights of Greece and 
protested this exploration with a Note Verbale of 14 June 1974. The Turkish Government, in its 
reply of 4 July 1974, refused to accept the Greek protest and repeated its suggestion of 
negotiations. On 22 August 1974, another protest in respect to further licenses for exploration 
was made by Greece. Turkey again did not accept it and insisted on negotiations.
The Greek Government, thereafter, proposed to the Turkish Government that the 
International Court of Justice might have the solution for the present case. Therefore, Greece put
100 Ibid.
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forward that it would be necessary to make a ‘''special agreement" for reference to the Court. 
Taking this suggestion into consideration, Turkey would agree, but gave priority to enter into 
negotiations on the question of the Aegean Sea continental shelf. As a result, both of the 
Governments decided on drafting a special agreement so that talks between the two Governments 
at ministerial level were started.
On 17-19 May 1975, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey met in Rome 
and gave initial considerations to the text of the special agreement that based on the submission 
of the matter to the International Court of Justice. After the Rome Meeting, the two Prime 
Ministers came together in Brussels and issued a joint communiqué on 31 May 1975. In the 
Brussels Communiqué, they conferred jurisdiction on the Court and decided on a future meeting 
of experts dealing with the question of continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. Turkey, by a Note of 
30 September 1975, made itself clear that the first step to settle this dispute should be 
attempting meaningful negotiations. After then, those issues, which could not be resolved by 
negotiations, would be jointly submitted to the Court. Turkey also referred to the Rome Meeting 
by emphasising that, the delimitation negotiations should take place parallel with the preparation 
of a special agreement. But, the Greek Government claimed that in the Brussels Communiqué it 
had been agreed that the issue would first be formally submitted to the Court.
t
The Turkish Government was not supporting the interpretation of the Greek side and 
therefore invited them to conduct meaningful negotiations for an agreed equitable settlement. 
After the conclusion of such negotiations, the other unresolved but well-defined legal issues 
could then be jointly submitted to the Court, if necessary. In the view of Greece, negotiation was
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in any case necessary in order to proceed with the drafting of the special agreement. If in the 
course of that negotiation, proposals that led to an agreement regarding the delimitation were put 
on the table, according to the Greeks, those proposals would be given appropriate consideration.
In accordance with the Brussels Communiqué, the experts of both sides met in Berne from 
31 January to 2 February and on 19 and 20 June 1976. In the 1976 Berne Protocol, two states 
established a standing committee “to study state practice and international law rules to identify 
certain principles and practical criteria” which might be applicable to the Aegean Sea.
In the Turkish press release of 13 July 1976, the Turkish Government granted hcenses to 
the seismic research vessel MTA-Sismik I in order to carry out exploration in the Turkish 
territorial sea and high seas. Moreover, in the statement on Turkish Radio on 24 July 1976, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister indicated that the these researches would be carried out in the areas of 
the Aegean claimed by Turkey and could extend to all areas of the Aegean outside the territorial 
waters of Greece. The research ship MTA-Sismik I  began conducting seismological exploration 
on 6 August 1976 in the Aegean waters and led to an warlike atmosphere.
When the vessel, MTA-Sismik /, began to its researches on the areas that according to 
Greece belonged to their continental shelf area, Greece made a diplomatic protest to the Turkish
t
Government in a Note Verbale dated 7 August 1976. On 10 August 1976, the Greek Government 
referred the matter simultaneously to the International Court of Justice requesting “interim 
measures of protection too”.'°* On the same day, Greece applied to the Security Council of the
101 In the view of Greece, in accordance with the interim measures of protection, the Governments of both States 
should first of all refrain from all exploration activity or any scientific research with respect to the areas in dispute
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United Nations and claimed that Turkey through its action had destroyed the peace in the area 
and should be stopped.
Greece, with its requests, aimed first of all at clarifying the delimitation of the continental 
shelf between Greece and Turkey and wanted from International Court of Justice a declaration 
that Greece was entitled to exercise over its continental shelf sovereign and exclusive rights for 
the purpose of researching, exploring and exploiting natural resources.
On 25 August 1976, the Security Council adopted resolution 395 (1976). In the third 
paragraph of that resolution, the Security Council suggested Greece and Turkey “to resume the 
direct negotiations over their differences” and offered them “to do everything within their power 
to ensure that this results in mutually acceptable solutions”. Moreover, the Court at its Order of 
11 September 1976 denied the request of Greece for interim measures of protection.
In justification of its request for interim measures, Greece claimed that certain acts of 
Turkey -the granting of petroleum exploration, the explorations of the vessel MTASismikl- 
constituted infringements of its exclusive sovereign rights to the exploration and exploitation of 
its continental shelf. As a result, that breach of the right of a coastal State became “irreparable 
prejudice” which was an important reason for the declaration of these measures. Moreover, they 
'stated that these activities would increase the tension of the dispute, if they continued.
unless having the consent of each other or pending the final judgment of the Court. Secondly, they should refrain 
from taking any military measures or actions which may endanger their peaceful relations.
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Consequently, the Court was unable to find a breach of Greece's rights that would lead to 
irreparable prejudice or any risk of the exercise of power to indicate interim measures of 
protection. The Court considered that both Governments will act in conformity with their 
obligations under the United Nations Charter and Security Council resolution 395 (1976) of 25 
August 1976, where the States were offered "to do everything in their power to reduce the present 
tensions in the area" and called on "to resume direct negotiations over their differences".
In the hght of this resolution, Greece and Turkey restarted their negotiations. The 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both states met in New York on 1 October 1976. In the New 
York Meeting, the continental shelf delimitation in the Aegean Sea was decided to be subject of 
negotiations between the two governments with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable 
settlement. From 2 to 11 November 1976, another meeting was convoked by the parties in Berne.
In the Berne Agreement, it was decided to hold negotiations with the aim of reaching an 
agreement on the dehmitation of the continental shelf. In addition to this, the parties also 
accepted that neither would explore for oil in the continental shelf of the Aegean until the issue of 
delimitation of the continental shelf was settled and the negotiations would be confidential. The 
Berne Meeting was confirmed by the Brussels Joint Communiqué which was concluded with the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and published on 11 December 1976. This was followed by other 
’meetings in Strasbourg, London, Paris, Montreux, Washington, Ankara and in Athens. In the 
Athens Meeting, they agreed that “the bilateral talks related to the continental shelf question 
should be resumed at the appropriate level on or about the December 1978”.
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3.2. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
By a letter of 10 August 1976,Greece instituted proceedings against Turkey in respect of a 
dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to each of the states in 
the Aegean Sea and their rights over those areas. Apart from the Application of the Greek 
Government, there was also another request which was instituted again in the same day (10 
August 1976). Greece sought the Court to declare interim measures of protection. But this request 
was rejected by the Court with its Order of 11 September 1976.
In this Application, the Greek Government requested the Court to adjudge and declare;
• what is the boundary (or boundaries) between the portions of the continental shelf 
appertaining to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea in accordance with the principles and 
rules of international law which the Court shall determine to be applicable to the delimitation 
of the continental shelf in the aforesaid areas of the Aegean Sea;
• that Greece is entitled to exercise over its continental shelf its sovereign and exclusive rights 
for the purpose of researching and exploring it and exploiting its natural resources;
• that the Greek Islands as part of the territory of Greece, are entitled to the portion of 
continental shelf which appertains to them according to the principles and rules of 
international law;
' that Turkey is not entitled to undertake any activities on the Greek continental shelf, whether 
by exploration, exploitation, research or otherwise, without the consent of Greece;
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• that the activities of Turkey constitute infringements of the sovereign and exclusive rights of 
Greece to explore and exploit its continental shelf or to authorise scientific research 
respecting the continental shelf;
• that Turkey shall not continue any further activities as described above within the areas of the 
continental shelf which the Court shall adjudge appertain to Greece.
On 25 August 1976, the Registry of the Court received a letter that included the observation 
of the Turkish Government on the request by the Government of Greece dated The Hague 10 
August 1977. In these observations, Turkey clearly expressed that International Court of Justice 
had no jurisdiction to entertain the Application. By an Order of 11 September 1976, which 
rejected the declcU'ation of the interim measures of protection, the Court focused on the question 
of its jurisdiction with respect to this case.
The Court aimed at assessing its function of jurisdiction and therefore fixed the time-limits 
for the written proceedings: 18 April 1976 for the filing of a Memorial by Greece and 24 October 
1976 for the filing of a Counter-Memorial by the Turkish Government. However, Greece 
requested extension of these time-limits which was provided by the Court as 18 July 1977 for 
Greece and 24 April 1977 for Turkey.
At the final stage, the Memorial of Greece was filed on due date. The main essences of the 
Memorial of the Greek Government were described as following:
102 For further information about the Requests of Greece, see, ICJ, Reports (1976), para. 10.
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“...the Government of Greece requests the Court to adjudge and declare 
that, whether on the basis of Article!? of the General Act for the Pacific 
Settlement o f International Disputes, 1928, read with Article 36, 
paragraph 2, and 37 of the Statute of the Court, or on the basis of the joint 
communiqué of Brussels dated 31 May 1975, the Court is competent to 
entertain the dispute between Greece and Turkey on the subject of the 
delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to the two countries in
the Aegean Sea.”103
On the other hand, the Turkish Government did not file any Counter-Memorial but send a 
letter dated 24 April 1978 which was the end of the time-limit for the written proceedings. In that 
letter Turkey stated the Government of Turkey did not intend to appoint an agent or file a 
Counter-Memorial. This letter had a similar context with the letter send by Turkey on 25 August 
1976. It stated inter aUia:
“It should in the view of the Government of Turkey, be recalled that that 
Application was filed although the two Governments had not yet begun 
negotiations on the substantive issue, as is clearly apparent from the 
context of the Notes exchanged by the Governments. It was however 
always contemplated between them that they would seek, through 
meaningful negotiations, to arrive at an agreement which would be 
acceptable to both parties.
Recalling the Security Council resolution 395 (1976) which offered direct negotiations 
resulting mutually acceptable solutions, the Turkish Government referred to the Berne 
Agreement of 11 November 1976. This agreement too gave special emphasise to the means of 
agreement. Article 1 of the Berne Agreement which was indicated in the letter of the Turkish 
Government, provided that the two Parties agree that negotiations shall be frank, thoroughgoing
103
104
Ibid., para. 12 
Ibid., para. 27
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and pursued in good faith with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual consent
with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the themselves. 105
Under the Ught of the Montreux Meeting, Turkey, in this letter, claimed that:
‘The necessary conditions for the conduct of frank and serious 
negotiations, and the spirit which should motivate the parties concerned, 
with a view to the settlement of their problems by such negotiations are 
not reconcilable with the continuation of international judicial 
proceedings.”
Coming to the oral arguments, the public hearings were held on 9-13 October and 16-17 
October 1978. Turkey was not represented at the hearings. The Greek side, on the other hand, 
participated to these proceedings. At the close of these proceedings, Greece stated that
‘The Government of Greece submits that the Court be pleased to declai'e 
itself competent to entertain to dispute between Greece and Turkey on the 
dehmitation of the respective areas of continental shelf appertaining to the
two countries in the Aegean Sea’,106
3.2.1. TURKEY AND GREECE
, The proceedings were ended without pleadings filed by the Government of Turkey and it 
was not represented at the oral proceedings. No formal submissions were therefore made by the 
Government of Turkey. But the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to this dispute were 
questioned by the letters of Turkey received by the Registrar of the Court on 25 August 1976, 24
105 Ibid.
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April 1978 and 10 October 1978. The Court began to deal with this question by referring to other 
cases and evidences. However, both states had their own arguments for the solution of this 
dispute.
According to the Turkish Government, the historical right to exploit the natural resources 
of the seabed of the Aegean affected economic interest and national security of both states. 
Because of this reason, political and legal issues should not be considered separately. So, a 
serious attempt should be made first to resolve the question equitably and taking into account the 
relevant circumstances through meaningful bilateral negotiations and then refer the unsolved 
issues to the judicial means, if necessary. The Greek Government, on the other hand, stated that 
the dispute should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.
Greece, claimed that because islands had their own continental shelves, the sovereign 
rights of Greece over almost the entire Aegean with respect to the 3000 Greek islands should not 
be infringed. As a result of this condition, a median line which would pass between the Turkish 
coast and the offshore islands should lead to the delimitation of the continental shelf of two 
states. The claims of Greece were based on its analyses of 1958 Geneva Convention. Turkey did 
not signed this convention because of the fact that it did not take into account seas with special 
circumstances, like the Aegean.
t
Turkey, due to this attempts, stated that the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf 
by using the equidistance method (median line) between the Eastern Aegean Islands and Turkey 
would breech the principle of equity, which was the cornerstone of such delimitation.
106 Ibid.,para. 13.
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Furthermore, it was clearly stated in the decision of the Court that the dehmitation was to be 
effected “by agreement in accordance with the equitable principles and taking account all 
relevant circumstances”. Sharing the same view, Turkey maintained that all efforts to solve the 
problem should not ignore the equilibrium estabhshed by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, relevant 
international agreements applicable in the region and the equitable principles.
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The International Court of Justice first of aU tried to analyse the attitude of the Turkish 
Government - Turkey did not participate in the proceedings and furthermore asserted that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Greek Application- by examining the exercise of its 
judicial function and assessing the existence of any legal dispute between the parties. Thereafter, 
it would turn to the case and find a solution regarding the dispute itself and the Application made 
by Greece.
Turkey had asked, the Court to reach the conclusion that it should not proceed with the 
case, while the parties continued to negotiate. In other words, the existence of active negotiations 
in progress hindered the jurisdiction of the Court. However, the Court did not share the same 
view. According to the Court, negotiation and judicial settlement were handled in Article 33 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. This article provided that:
3.3. THE COURT
1. The Parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of the international peace and security, shall, 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the 
parties to settle their dispute by such means.
Moreover, ‘"the Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War” proved that the judicial proceedings 
could be ended, when such negotiations efforts would result in agreement for both sides. 
Therefore, in the view of the Court, the fact that negotiations tried to be achieved during the
107 ICI, Reports (1973), p.347.
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proceedings, did not lead legally to any obstacle to the judicial function of the Court as it was 
stated in the letter of Turkey.
The Court, apart from this interpretation, developed another argument due to the letter of 
the Turkish side. There it was stated that there was no dispute between the parties during the 
negotiation process, that is to say, the Court could not for that reason, exercise its Jurisdiction in 
this case. The answer to this argument came with the Order of 11 September 1976.
In its Order, the Court recalled that on 10 August 1976 Greece instituted proceedings 
against Turkey in respect of a dispute concerning the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. Greece 
requested the Court inter allia to declare what was the course of the boundaiy between the 
portions of the continental shelf appertaining respectively to Greece and Turkey in the area, and 
to declare that Turkey was not entitled to undertake any activities on the Greek continental shelf, 
whether by exploration, exploitation, research or otherwise, without the consent of Greece. As a 
result, the existence of a dispute according to the Court, could hardly be open to doubt.
Finally, the Court referred to a further argument that described the dispute between 
Turkey and Greece “as highly pohtical nature”. The Court shared the same view. It was too 
difficult to fail to have some political element in the dispute. Because, the parties were in conflict 
within their respective rights. In other words, both of the states were in conflict as to the 
delimitation of their continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Therefore, the Court found that there 
existed a legal dispute between Greece and Turkey in respect to the continental shelf in the 
Aegean Sea and the active negotiations could not legally be any obstacle to the judicial function 
of the Court.
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3.4.1. First Basis of Jurisdiction: Article 17 of the General Act of 1928
In its Application, the Greek Government specified two bases on which it claimed that the 
Court had jurisdiction in the dispute. The first was Article 17 of the General Act of 1928 for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, read with Article 36, paragraph 1, and Article 37 of 
the Statute of the Court.
Article 17 of the General Act was as follows:
3.4. THE DESICION OF THE COURT
"All disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their 
respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be made 
under Article 39, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, unless the parties agree, in the manner hereinafter 
provided, to have resort to an arbitral tribunal. It is understood that the 
disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 
36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice."
This Article thus provided for the reference of disputes to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. That body was the predecessor of the present Court, which, by the effect of 
Article 37 of its own Statute, was substituted for it in any treaty or convention in force. In other 
'words, if the General Act was to be considered as a convention in force between Greece and 
Turkey, it might, when read with Article 37 and Article 36, paragraph 1, of the present Court's 
Statute, suffice to establish the jurisdiction.
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However, the question of the status of the General Act of 1928 as a convention in force 
for the purposes of Article 37 of the Statute was challenged in previous cases before the Court. In 
the present case the Greek Government contended that the Act must be in force between Greece 
and Turkey; while the Turkish Government, on the contrary, stated that the Act was no longer in 
force.
The Court noted that Greece draw attention to the fact that both the Greek and the Turkish 
side had reservations within this Act. Greece put forward that these were in-elevant to the case. 
Turkey, on the other hand, took the position that, whether or not the General Act was assumed to 
be in force, Greece's instrument of accession, dated 14 September 1931, was subject to a clause- 
reservation (b).This reservation would exclude the competence of the Court with respect to the 
dispute. The text of this reservation (b) was as follows:
"The following disputes are excluded from the procedures described in 
the General Ac t .. .
"(b) disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and in particular disputes 
relating to the territorial status of Greece, including disputes relating to its 
rights of sovereignty over its ports and hnes of communication.
The Court considered that, if the effect of reservation (b) on the applicability of the Act as 
between Greece and Turkey with respect to the subject-matter of the dispute was justified, then 
the question whether the Act was or was not in force would not be an essential factor for the 
decision regarding the jurisdiction of the Court.
108See, Reports (1976), Judgement.
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According to Greece, the Court should leave reservation (b) out of consideration. 
Because, the applicability of the General Act was not raised regularly by Turkey in accordance 
with the Rules of Court, so that Turkey had not required to obey the reservation. Because, by 
Article 39, paragraph 3, of the General Act, it was stated that "If one of the parties to a dispute 
has made a reservation, the other parties may enforce the same reservation in regard to that 
party.” In the view of the Court, Turkey's invocation of reservation (b) made in a formal 
statement must be considered as constituting an "enforcement" of the reservation within the 
meaning of Article 39, paragraph 3, of the Act. The Court was therefore unable to ignore a 
reservation the invocation of which was brought to its notice earher in the proceedings.
Greece maintained that reservation (b) could not cover the dispute regarding the 
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea and therefore did not exclude the normal operation of 
Article 17 of the Act. In particular it was related to disputes relating to the territorial status of 
Greece where at the same time "questions which by international law are solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of States" occurred.
This argument depended on a grammatical interpretation which based on the meaning of 
"and in particular" ("et, notamment," in the original French of the reservation). After considering 
this interpretation, the Court concluded that it could not base itself on a grammatical 
interpretation of the text and found that reservation (b) contained two separate and autonomous 
reservations.
109 Ibid.
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The first one included disputes concerning questions of domestic jurisdiction and the 
other reserving "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece". The Court then assessed 
what must be understood by "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece".
Greece maintained that a restrictive view of the meaning must be taken, due to the 
historical context. Because, those words were related to the territorial settlements estabhshed by 
the peace treaties after the World War I . In the opinion of the Court, the historical evidence 
claimed by Greece did not confirm that in reservation (b) the expression "territorial status" was 
used with the meaning of “any matters properly to be considered as belonging to the concept of 
territorial status in public international law”. The expression therefore included not only the 
particular legal regime but also the territorial integrity and the boundaries of a State.
Greece argued that the idea of the continental shelf was unknown in 1928 when the 
General Act was concluded, and in 1931 when Greece became a part of the Act. But, in the 
Court's view, the words "territorial status" in the Greek reservation and also "rights" in Article 17 
of the General Act, was to follow the evolution of the law and to correspond with the meaning 
attached to it by the law in force at any given time. The Court therefore found that the expression 
"disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece" must be interpreted in accordance with the 
rules of international law as they exist today.
The Court then tried to examine whether the expression "disputes relating to the territorial 
status of Greece" should or should not include disputes relating to the rights of Greece over the 
continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Greece argued that the dispute concerned the delimitation of 
the continental shelf could not be connected with territorial status. According to the Court, on the
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other hand, it would be difficult to accept that delimitation was not bound to the notion of 
territorial status and pointed out that a dispute regarding delimitation of a continental shelf tended 
by its very nature to be one relating to territorial status. Because, the rights of a coastal State's 
over the continental shelf would be derived fi'om its sovereignty over the land. Besides, the 
territorial status of the coastal State included the rights of exploration and exploitation over the 
continental shelf which was stated under international law.
In relation with these considerations, the Court came to the opinion that the dispute was 
related to the territorial status of Greece within the meaning of reservation (b). Therefore, the 
reservation had the effect of excluding the dispute from the application of Article 17 of the 
General Act. The General Act was as a result not a valid basis for the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Court also interpreted a suggestion that the General Act had never been applicable 
between Turkey and Greece, because of existence of the “Treaty o f Friendship, Neutrality, 
Conciliation and Arbitration” between two states (30 October 1930). The Court stated that by the 
effect of reservation (b), the Act was not apphcable to the dispute, and the 1930 treaty was not 
invoked as a basis for its jurisdiction.
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3.4.2. Second Basis of Jurisdiction: the Brussels Joint Communiqué of 31 May 1975
The second basis of jurisdiction relied upon by Greece was the Brussels Joint 
Communiqué of 31 May 1975. This was a communiqué issued directly to the press by the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey following a meeting between them on that date. It contained the 
following passage:
"They (the two Prime Ministers) decided that those problems (between 
the two countries) should be resolved peacefully by means of negotiations 
and as regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International
Court at The Hague. 1.110
Greece maintained that this passage directly conferred jurisdiction on the Court, Turkey, 
for its part, maintained that the communiqué did not "amount to an agreement under international 
law". The Court, on the other hand, found confirmation that the two Prime Ministers did not 
undertake any unconditional commitment to refer their continental shelf dispute to the Court.
As the consequence of this, the Brussels communiqué did not constitute an immediate 
commitment between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. Therefore, the submission of 
the dispute to the Court unilaterally by Application could not be acceptable. In the view of the 
Court, this could not become a valid basis for the jurisdiction of Court. The Court decided that 
neither the 1928 General Act nor the Brussels Communiqué were relevant and applicable to the 
present dispute between Greece and Turkey. It was without jurisdiction to entertain the 
Application filed by the Government of Greece on 10 August 1976. The Court, finally, added 
that nothing it had said might be understood as precluding the dispute from being brought before 
the Court if and when the conditions for establishing its jurisdiction were satisfied.
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CHAPTER 4
OTHER DECISIONS
The contribution of the International Court of Justice to two continental shelf disputes in 
the Mediterranean Sea should be examined under the Light of the other cases that came to the 
forefront of the Court. In this way, the attitude of the Court due to the changing nature of 
international law would be clearly analysed.
It was obvious that both cases- Tunisia and Libya Case and the Aegean Sea Case- were 
shaped with different backgrounds, requests and conclusions. But, they met in two common 
points. The first was that aU of the parties involved to these cases presented from the same 
disagreement: the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to those states in accordance 
with the principles and rules of international law.
The second was that the International Court of Justice was faced with both cases. Under 
these focal points, it would be necessary to come a conclusion in the light of the other cases 
which were sharing the same considerations: the delimitation of the continental and the attitude 
of the International Court of Justice.
H. Pazarcı, “Uluslar Arası Hukuk Dersleri” , Ankara,Turhan , (1998) p.407.
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The language of the 1982 Convention has been interpreted by some jurists as a reference 
to the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, where the Court clearly stated that the delimitation 
had to be effected in accordance with the principle of equity and taking into account all relevant 
circumstances.
In this case, the application of the equidistance method was denied by Germany. If this 
method would be applied, then Germany would have a small share of the shelf. Because, the 
coastline of Germany was concave. However, the Court did not ignored the relevant 
circumstances and took it into account for achieving an equitable solution. According to the 
Court, an equitable solution included the configuration of the coastline and the proportionality 
between the length of the coasthne of a nation and the area of the continental shelf of the nation.
The North Sea Continental Shelf Case relied on the principle of the natural prolongation. 
According to this view, the undersea shelf was considered as an extension of the continental land 
mass. This view led to the conclusion that the islands on the prolongation of the landmass did not 
have the same capacity to generate continental shelf of their own.
4.1. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE
Consequently, the Court said in its decision that “the presence of the islets, rocks and 
minor coastal projections, the disproportionately distorting effect of which could be eliminated 
by other means”, should be ignored in the continental shelf delimitation. This point of view was 
based on the notion that all islands did not generate equal maritime zones. Because, aU islands
77
did not have equal marine space as the continental land. However, this approach was not stated 
by Article 121 of Law of the Sea Conference. It defined the regime of the islands as follows:
1. An islands is a naturally formed area of land surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous 
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island 
are determined in accordance with the provisions of this convention 
applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”
One should emphasise that Article 121 is ambiguous and it is difficult to give a precise meaning 
to its language. This was caused by the fact that during the negotiations initiated at United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference in mid-1975 which led to the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention several draft proposals were submitted on the determination of the maritime space of 
the islands according to various criteria.
Although these views were controversial and difficult to reach t o an agreement, a Single 
Negotiated Text (SNT) was prepared in April 1975. This text was an attempt to formulate articles 
that would represent some areas of consensus. With this document, it was aimed at setting up the 
basis of further negotiations and achieving a general consensus. But, the language of this 
document too was ambiguous. These ambiguities remained in the following revised SNTs and 
also were reproduced by the Draft Treaty of August 1980. After this date, no sufficient 
discussions took place on the regime of the islands, because of the pressure to complete the 
Convention in 1982. As a consequence, the wording of the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention Article 121 was nothing more than a reproduction of numerous revised SNTs, which 
were prepared as negotiation drafts. This explains the ambiguity of Article 121.
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This dispute required the international arbitral tribunal to determine whether the British 
Channel Islands had a continental shelf as separate islands and what would be the influence of 
these islands on a continental shelf delimitation between England and France.
The Channel Islands consisted of four group of islands, including the main islands of Jersey, 
Guernesey, Alderney, Sar, Herm, and Jethou, as well as a large number of rocks and islets, some 
of which were inhabited. These islands were under British sovereignty, but were located as close 
as 6.6 km from the French coastline. Geological evidence indicated that the physical landmass of 
Britannia and Normandy. These islands had a total land area of 195 square kilometres and a 
population of 130,000. PohticaUy, the Channel Islands were British dependencies but not 
constitutionally a part of the United Kingdom.
As a result, the tribunal afforded to Britain 12 nautical-mile enclaves around the Channel 
Islands but stated that otherwise they could not effect the delimitation of the boundary and the 
area around these enclaves would belong to France. On the question of the method that would be 
applied in the area, the tribunal rejected the British proposal that the median line should 
“automatically deviate southwards in a long loop around the Channel Islands”. Furthermore, the 
tribunal also stated that the juridical concept of natural prolongation required consideration of 
geographical circumstances to be viewed in light of “any relevant consideration of law and 
equity”.
4.2. THE 1977 ANGLO-FRENCH ARBITRATION
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This arbitration also dealt with the relative weight to be given to the Sicily Isles belonging to 
France and located on the British Coast near Land’s End. They were lying some 34 km from the 
mainland and were a group of 48 islands and only 6 of them were inhabited.
The tribunal, as result, constructed set of baselines and equidistance lines which formed a 
triangle to solve the dispute. So it was clear that in this case also the tribunal based its discussions 
on the principle of equity and relevant circumstances. (Map 7 illustrates the decision of the Court 
on p.82.)
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Map 7. The Anglo-French Arbitration
* Source: International boundary Cases, Cambridge: Grotius, p.209
In 1978, Australia and Papua New Guinea negotiated a solution on the problem created by 
the presence of Australian islands just south to the main islands of Papua New Guinea. It was 
agreed by both states that these small Australian islands would produce an “inequitable boundary, 
if given full effect”. Therefore it was decided that these small islands would generate the fishing 
zones but they would have no effect on the continental shelf boundary and thus these Austrahan 
islands were located on the Papua New Guinea continental shelf. Moreover, the agreement also 
created a protected zone to preserve the traditional way of life for the inhabitants of the islands.
4.4. GULF OF MAINE CASE
In the determination of the boundary between Canada and USA in the Gulf of Maine Case 
on the other hand, Canada’s Seal Islands, Mud Island and other adjacent islets in the vicinity of 
Cape Nova Scotia were given only a partial effect in 1984 by the Court. In this case also the 
Court relied on a two-sector line. The first being drawn following an equidistance formula. 
Thereafter, the second sector allocated ocean space between USA and Canada in a ratio 
proportional to the relative lengths of their coastlines in the Gulf. As a result, no effect was given 
to the Seal Island and its neighbouring islets and then the ratio of ocean area belonging to the 
United States compared to that of Canada would be 1.38 to 1.
The Court decided that although the Seal Islands and its neighbours “cannot be 
disregarded” because of dimension and geographical position, it would be “excessive” to give 
them full effect. Thus, the Court decided it was appropriate to give the islands half effect and as a 
result USA -Canada ocean space became 1.32 to 1. (Map 8 shows the general map on p.84.)
4.3. AUSTRALIA AND NEW GUINEA NEGOTIATION
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Map 8. Gulf o f Maine
* Source;International boundary Cases, Cambridge;Grotius, p.318
G e n e r a l  M a p  o f  t h e  R e g i o n , S h o w i n g  t h e  S t a r t i n g - P o i n t  f o r  t h e  
D e l i m i t a t i o n  L i n e  a n d  t h e  A r e a  f o r  it s  T e r m i n a t i o n
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4.5. LIBYA-MALTA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE
In this case, the Court ruled that equitable principle required that the tiny islands of Filfa -  
belonging to Malta 5 km south to the main island- should not be taken into account. In 
determining the boundary between the two countries. With this consideration, the Court made a 
big change in its jurisprudence.
In contradiction to its order in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the Court decided to 
abandon the criteria of natural prolongation in the determination of the continental shelf. 
According to the Court, as the new developments in the international law recognised to the 
coastal state the right to claim a continental shelf up to 200 miles, regardless the geological 
features of the seabed in the determination of the countries’ rights or the dehmitation of the 
boundaries in the case of conflicting claims, there was no reason to attribute any role to the 
geological or geopolitical factors. In view of the Court, there was also no reason for taking into 
account a special circumstance as a factor which had no role in the creation of a right.
It thus became obvious that the Court with its decision of 1985 on the Libya-Malta Case 
discarded the principle of natural prolongation in the determination of the continental shelf and 
damaged the link between the principle and the delimitation. Staring with the 1969 North Sea 
Case until the Libya- Malta Case in all International Court of Justice and tribunal decisions an 
equitable solution was accepted as an independent principle of international law, while the 
equidistance method (median line) which did not however, have any priority, was considered as 
one of the methods to be relied on for attaining an equitable solution.
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With this case, the Court estabhshed a linkage between the creation of the continental 
shelf right and the method of dehmitation. It put forward that because the continental shelf was 
based on the criterion of distance. As a result, the dehmitation should be initiated by applying 
first the equidistance method as an intermediary method. Only, in the second phase, relevant 
circumstances should be taken into account to make adjustments so that equidistance would 
produce results which were equitable.
Consequently, the principle of equity was denied the status of independent principle of 
law to be applied in the dehmitation of the continental shelf as in the North Sea Case and the 
1977 Anglo-French Arbitration. It only retained the function of adjustment of the results of the 
equidistance method.
85
CONCLUSION
LEGAL ARGUMENT AS A SOLUTION
As it would be observed from the above explanations, there were differences in the 
attitude of the Court in the cases which were based on the disagreements about the delimitation of 
the continental shelf in the respective areas of the participating states. As a consequence of the 
attitude of the Court, some points could be stated in order to analyse the Court and its 
contribution to these cases.
First of all, the principles which had to be applied in the determination of the boundaries 
of the maritime spaces did not gained clarity in international law. They are in the process of 
evolution. Secondly, there was no consistency and continuity in the decision of the Coun and the 
tribunals on the continental shelf. It was observed that the same judicial organ could give 
contradictory decisions on similar cases
Because of the fact that it is too difficult to establish legal principles for the determination 
of the continental shelf in a sea like the Mediterranean, where geographical and pohtical features 
are so complex and intermingled, it would follow that the adoption of a judicial procedure for 
solving the problem would assess the issue as an isolated legal question. Moreover, the political 
and security issues should be separated from each other and the results would produce results 
which would endanger the vital interest in the Aegean.
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As a result, the issue should be resolved through bilateral negotiations aiming at the 
reconciliation of the security, political, economic and maritime interests of the states regarding to 
the dispute and also these negotiations should also allow the countries to establish trade-off.
JOINT DEVELOPMENT AS A SOLUTION
Joint development is the most logical solution to such disputes. Because, it allows the 
parties to postpone the final decision on how to draw the boundary. Although not setting up a 
certain delimitation of the continental shelf, the joint development should provide the opportunity 
for exploitation of the resources for the benefit of the population of all parties concerned.
It has to be noted that joint development zones were created between Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, Japan and Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, Norway and Iceland, 
and most recently Australia and Indonesia. In a joint development project, usually a joint 
cooperation is formed by the parties and the persons nominated by them manage the cooperation. 
The states provide the capital requirement and supervise the development of the area as well as 
the activities undertaken by the cooperation The resources are explored and exploited through 
concessions granted by the joint development agency with the revenue shared by the parties 
according to a formula that had the consent of the parties.
Finally, the Mediterranean Sea is an important factor for uniting the states within its 
shores. Because, this area is characterised by the diversity especially in ethnic, religious, cultural 
and political perceptions. This element may contribute to situations of potential instability , crises
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or endemic conflicts. Therefore, the peaceful completion of maritime boundary delimitation 
plays a crucial role for reducing tension and thus providing the process of peace and security in 
the Mediterranean Sea. The solution should be shaped by the joint development aiming at 
protection and rational exploitation of the natural resources of the sea. Because, this may provide 
the necessary environment for peaceful coexistence among its httoral.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
ORDER OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1976
“Whereas: the areas of the continental shelf in which the activity complained of by Greece took 
place are ex hvpotesi areas, which at the present stage of the proceedings are t o be considered by 
the Court as areas in dispute with respect to which Turkey also claims rights of exploration and 
exploitation.”
The Court finds, by 12 votes to 1, that the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the 
Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to 
indicate interim measures of protection, decides that the written procedures shall first be 
addressed to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute and reserves the 
fixing of the time-limits for the said written proceedings, and the subsequent procedures for 
further decision.
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APPENDIX B
THE BERNE DECLARATION
On the procedure to be followed for the delimitation of the continental shelf by Greece and
Turkey.
1. Both parties are agree that negotiations be sincere, detailed and conducted in good faith with 
a view to reaching an agreement based on mutual consent regarding the delimitation of the 
continental shelf.
2. Both parties are agree that these negotiations should, due to their nature, be strictly 
confidential.
3. Both parties reserve their respective positions regarding the dehmitation of the continental 
shelf.
4. Both parties undertake the obhgation not to use the details of this agreement and the 
proposals that each will make during the negotiations in any circumstances outside the 
context of the negotiations.
5. Both parties agree no statements or leaks to the press should be made referring to the content 
of the negotiations unless they commonly agree to do so.
6. Both parties undertake to abstain from any initiative or act relating to the continental shelf of 
the Aegean Sea which might prejudice the negotiations.
7. Both parties undertake, as far as their bilateral relations are concerned, to abstain from any 
initiative or act which would tend to discredit the other party.
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8. Both parties have agreed to study state practice and international rules on this subject with a 
view to deducing certain principles and practical criteria which could be of use in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries.
9. A mixed commission will be set up to this end will be composed of national representatives.
10. Both parties agree to adopt a gradual approach in the course of the negotiations ahead after 
consulting each other.
Signed in Berne: 11* November, 1976.
Released in Athens and Ankara: 20'*’ November, 1976.
91
SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN TUNISIA AND LIBYA
Article 1
The Court is requested to render its Judgment in the following matter:
What are the principles and rules of international law which may be applied for the delimitation 
of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the Republic of Tunisia and the area of the 
continental-shelf appertaining to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and, in rendering 
its decision, to take account of equitable principles and the relevant circumstances which 
characterise the area, as well as the recent trends admitted at the Third Conference on the Law of 
the Sea.
Also, the Court is further requested to specify precisely the practical way in which the aforesaid 
principles and rules apply in this particular situation so as to enable the experts of the two 
countries to delimit those areas without any difficulties.
Article 2
Immediately following, the delivery of the Judgment by the Court, the two Parties shall meet to 
put into effect these principles and rules to determine the line of delimitation of the area of the 
continental shelf appertaining to each of the two countries, with a view to the conclusion of a 
treaty in this matter.
APPENDIX C
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Article 3
In the event that the agreement mentioned in Article 2 is not reached within a period of three 
months, renewable by mutual agreement, from the date of delivery of the Court's Judgment, the 
two Parties shall together go back to the Court and request such explanations or clarifications as 
may facilitate the task of the two delegations, to arrive at the line separating the two areas of the 
continental shelf, and the two Parties shall comply with the Judgment of the Court and with its 
explanations and clarifications.
Article 4
A. The proceedings shall consist of written pleadings and oral argument.
B. Without prejudice to any question that may arise relating to the means of proof, the written 
pleadings shall consist of the following documents
(1) Memorials to be submitted to the Court and exchanged between the two Parties within a 
period not exceeding eighteen (18) months from the date of the notification of the present 
Special Agreement to the Registrar of the Court.
(2) Counter-Memorials to be submitted by both Parties to the Court and exchanged between 
them as follows : the Republic of Tunisia shall submit its Counter-Memorial within a period of 
six (6) months from the date on which it receives from the Court notification of the Memorial; 
the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shall submit its Counter-Memorial within a period 
of eight (8) months from the date on which it receives from the Court notification of the 
Memorial.
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(3) If necessary, additional written pleadings to be submitted to the Court and exchanged within 
periods to be fixed by the Court at the request of either Party or, if the Court so decides, after 
consultation between the two Parties.
C. The question of the order of speaking for the oral argument shall be decided by mutual 
agreement between the Parties and whatever order of speaking may be adopted, it shall be 
without prejudice to any question relating to the burden of proof.
Article 5
This Special Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the instruments of its 
ratification are exchanged and shall be notified to the Registrar of the Court by both Parties or by 
either of them.
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